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Executive summary 
High quality education is consistently a public priority in opinion polls.  The quality of education is 
also a key driver of productivity and economic success, as well as social mobility and inclusion.  
It is to be welcomed that all of the main parties make aspirational statements to improve education 
in their manifestos. 
The Conservative manifesto notes that: “Talent and genius are uniformly distributed throughout the 
country. Opportunity is not. Now is the time to close that gap… Every child should have the same 
opportunity to express their talents and make the most of their lives…” 
The Labour manifesto promises a National Education Service to “nurture every child and adult to 
find a path that’s right for them”. The Liberal Democrats pledge to “give every child the best start in 
life, no matter their ability or background”. 
This analysis of the manifesto promises of the five main parties (Conservative, Labour, Liberal 
Democrat, Green and Brexit parties) seeks to assess the likely impact of each of their education 
policies, considers how far these seem to be based on the best research available and judges 
whether the stated aspirations are likely to be met in practice. 
While there are some notable differences in the policies of each main party, all are promising a more 
generous funding settlement for education than has been the case since 2010. But the parties are 
proposing to spend different amounts of money on different phases of education and targeted in 
different ways. There are some important differences in both the likely cost pressures arising from 
each party’s plans as well as the impact they will have on pupil outcomes and equity.  
None of the parties make reference to how they plan to secure value for money from the additional 
investment in schools or to support schools to make efficiency savings where needed. 
In the case of each party, spending commitments are contingent on higher taxes, savings or other 
revenue sources. The Conservative plans assume that the growth impact of Brexit will be moderate; 
the Labour plans assume the same, and also rely upon large tax revenues from a limited number of 
sources; meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats are banking on a ‘remain bonus’, and revenues from 
uncertain sources such as tax avoidance. With all parties, it is unclear how education spending plans 
would be altered if revenues prove less robust than planned. 
 The Conservative Party 
The Conservative Party’s manifesto section on education is notably shorter than in 2017. We assume 
that this indicates that much of current government policy will continue. The manifesto contains 
some key policies which could support improved education standards – including a commitment to 
retain the current framework of accountability (although there are no commitments to address the 
flaws in the current system) and the introduction of higher pay for newly qualified teachers, to boost 
recruitment and retention. A new National Skills Fund aims to improve skills and training in the 
workplace. 
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There are, however, a number of areas where the proposed policy agenda is unlikely to support the 
very boldly stated aspirations which the Conservative government has set out for raising attainment 
and ensuring greater equality of opportunity. 
Despite around 40 per cent of the disadvantage gap at age 16 already being present at age 5, the 
Conservative manifesto has little to say about improved early years education. Policy in this area 
seems largely focused on childcare, to help parents who want to return to or remain in employment. 
England has a relatively low funded, poorly paid and under-qualified early years workforce, and 
some of the existing entitlement policy (such as the 30 hour policy) excludes many poorer children. 
The Conservative manifesto does nothing to address these issues, and it is therefore difficult to see 
any significant reduction in the early years gap under the Conservative approach. 
On school funding, the planned rise in real terms funding could help make teacher pay more 
competitive (particularly for newly qualified teachers) and so improve retention. But the extent of 
these gains will be limited, as the planned real terms rise (of 7.4 per cent) is modest and will leave 
per pupil funding in 2022-23 at the same level in real terms as in 2009-10 – and with schools needing 
to bear the cost of increases in pay and pensions.  
A major concern is that under the Conservative plans the additional funding for schools will be 
skewed towards those schools serving less disadvantaged communities. Our analysis finds that, 
under current government plans, over a third of the most disadvantaged primary schools and half of 
the most disadvantaged secondary schools outside London would receive inflation-only increases in 
their budgets. 
There is also no Conservative commitment to uprate the Pupil Premium for inflation – this would 
mean that, over the period from 2014-15 to 2022-23, the Pupil Premium would decline by 15 per 
cent in real terms. The risk is that the Conservative commitment to ‘level-up’ funding could, 
combined with real terms cuts to the Pupil Premium, actually widen the attainment gap. 
There is also no commitment to further increases in funding for pupils with SEND after 2020-21, 
suggesting that this will continue to be an area that will suffer from funding pressures and where 
funding will fall significantly short of the £1bn recommended by the Education Select Committee. 
Funding for 16-19 education will increase under Conservative plans but there is only a commitment 
for one year and it is unclear whether funding for this phase will be increased or held steady over 
the rest of the Parliament. The 16-19 per-pupil funding rate proposed by the Conservative party is 
lower than that proposed by Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
The Conservative manifesto makes a commitment to “ensure that parents can choose the schools 
that best suit their children”. It is not clear what this means in practice but it does leave open the 
option to expand places in selective schools (or create new selective schools) – a measure which, as 
EPI research shows, could have a detrimental effect on disadvantaged pupils. Current Conservative 
policy to increase grammar schools capacity in areas where these schools already exist has been 
shown by EPI research to potentially have negative attainment impacts on those not admitted into 
selective schools. 
There are some major policy challenges which the Conservative manifesto appears to have no 
proposals to address, including the large number of unexplained exits from school 
(disproportionately affecting more vulnerable pupils), the uneven access to top performing state 
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schools across the country and the relative shortage of subject qualified teachers in more 
disadvantaged schools. 
Finally, the manifesto section on higher education is surprisingly short of new policies, given that the 
government commissioned an independent review into the issue in February 2018 and received a 
detailed set of proposals from the review team earlier this year. On funding, the only pledge appears 
to be to reduce the interest rate on student loans. While popular with students, the gains from this 
policy would go disproportionately to higher earning graduates and would have little or no impact 
on educational attainment or the disadvantage gap. 
In spite of the strong statement Conservative commitment to closing the gap and giving “each child 
the same opportunity”, our assessment is that the Conservative manifesto proposals are unlikely to 
deliver on these aspirations.  
In the last few years the reduction in the disadvantage gap appears to be stalling and while the 
Conservatives now plan an end to real terms school cuts, the measures set out in the Conservative 
manifesto are unlikely to have a significant impact on closing the disadvantage gap over the coming 
years. 
 The Labour Party 
The Labour Party has also made a large commitment to additional education funding. Its manifesto 
costing document sets out that by 2023-24, it is promising £5.2bn extra for improved early years 
education, £5.1bn extra for schools, £4.4bn for improved skills training and lifelong learning, £6.7bn 
more (net) for higher education, and £1.0bn for its National Youth Service.1  
Labour proposals on early years education would lead to a large increase in the funding for 2-4 year-
olds. Additional hours of education, improved staff pay and qualifications, and other support to 
parents could help to reduce the large disadvantage gap by age 5. However, it may take time to 
recruit and train additional staff and it will be important to ensure that very large rises in funding are 
used effectively. Since research suggests that early years education needs to be high quality to have 
an impact on longer-term outcomes, there is a risk that this very rapid increase in spending may not 
deliver value for money in the short term. 
Labour also plans a significant rise in school spending – an additional 14.6 per cent per pupil by 
2022-23. This would mean that per pupil funding is materially higher than in 2009-10. Labour has 
also indicated that it will protect the Pupil Premium in real terms, and provide additional special 
needs funding, both of which could be expected to help with efforts to narrow the attainment gap.2  
Labour also promises larger increases in teacher pay than any other party (5 per cent in the first 
year) but does not address the challenge of attracting more of the best qualified teachers to the 
most challenging schools, nor does it set out a convincing strategy for improved school quality in 
parts of the country where there are few high performing schools. 
In addition, Labour’s policies on private education could lead to additional costs from pupils being 
diverted into the state-funded sector by higher private fees. It is not clear whether policies such as a 
                                                          
1 In 2019-20 prices. The Labour Party’s costing document presents cash amounts in 2023-24. 
2 The commitment to protect the Pupil Premium was confirmed in correspondence from the Labour Party on 
27 November 2019. 
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maximum class sizes of 30 in primary schools offer value for money. Labour also propose to extend 
free school meals to all primary aged pupils. We estimate that Labour costings on this are around 
£140m lower than is needed due to increases in staffing costs. If the National Living Wage is 
increased to £10 per hour (as per Labour’s plans), this shortfall could double.  
Labour also plans significant changes in policy on assessment, testing, inspection and accountability. 
These plans to dismantle the key aspects of the current accountability system are counter to 
evidence that strong systems of accountability can help deliver improvements in attainment and a 
narrowing of the gap. 
On how schools will be governed, and held to account, it is clear that the Labour manifesto 
envisages a return to a system with far more local authority oversight and involvement – but it is not 
clear how this would work in practice and what impact it would have on school standards. There is 
little evidence to suggest that, at a system level, structural reform makes much difference to 
educational standards. 
Labour does, however, acknowledge the issue of increasing unexplained pupil exits from schools, 
although its proposed solution could come with unintended consequences. 
The Labour manifesto also proposes a number of measures to improve out-of-school services which 
are important to more vulnerable young people, and where action could improve learning 
outcomes. For example, Labour propose to double the annual spending on children and adolescent 
mental health services. If well targeted and delivered, this could help improve outcomes for many 
vulnerable children. 
Labour has made a strong commitment to improved 16-19 funding, which seems to be rational when 
looking at international experience, and some of the recent trends in funding and curriculum in this 
sector.  
Labour proposes additional spending on lifelong learning and improved access to Level 4-6 training, 
which could help address the current skills gap. 
Labour’s largest education spending pledge is on higher education, where it proposes to spend 
£6.7bn abolishing tuition fees and restoring maintenance grants. Transferring more of the HE 
funding burden from students to taxpayers can be expected to be popular with students, but there is 
little evidence that it will improve education outcomes, including participation. The policy also 
comes with some long-term risks to universities – that in competition with other public spending, a 
Labour government might seek to reduce overall funding, which could impact on unit funding or 
participation, or both. 
Labour’s manifesto includes no proposals to address the challenge of attracting the most qualified 
teachers to the most challenging schools and does not set out a convincing strategy for tackling poor 
performing schools. 
In conclusion, Labour’s manifesto proposals on early years education, children’s mental health, 
school and college funding, and teacher pay, could all help boost attainment and narrow the 
disadvantaged gap. But Labour proposals on accountability and structural reform could impact 
negatively on value for money and could offset gains from these other policies.  
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Labour’s largest education pledge – to spend £6.7bn on abolishing university tuition fees and 
restoring maintenance grants – has little to commend it in terms of education outcomes. This money 
could be better targeted at those phases of education and particular challenges, where a large 
impact on attainment and disadvantage gaps might be expected.  
Finally, it should be noted that while Labour’s commitment to spend a large additional amount on 
education should be welcomed, this is in the context of a manifesto with large pledges on resource 
spending which require big increases in tax revenues, which come with some risks and uncertainties. 
It is unclear how Labour would respond to its planned revenue coming in under budget and whether 
the financial commitments to education would then be at risk. 
The Liberal Democrats 
The Liberal Democrats have also made a large financial commitment to additional education 
spending. Its manifesto costing document sets out that by 2024-25, £9.6bn extra is proposed for 
schools, £12.7bn for early years education and childcare, £1.1bn for extending free school meals, 
£1.5bn for further education and youth services, £0.9bn for restoring maintenance grants, and 
£1.5bn for introducing a new ‘Skills Wallet’ for all adults.3 
The Liberal Democrats have proposed the largest spending package on early years education and 
childcare and propose significant increases in the annual hours of free childcare for all 2-4 year olds 
– including more than trebling average funding for children in non-working families. Much of the 
money would be focused on childcare support to enable employment, but the emphasis on a higher 
Early Years Pupil Premium, improved entitlements for disadvantaged pupils, and improved staff 
qualifications could all help to reduce the gap and improve child development. The scale of the 
Liberal Democrat commitment would mean that “early investment” would move from rhetoric to 
reality and would be higher per student than in the primary and secondary education phases. 
However, the speed and scale of change raises risks that the plans will prove too ambitious, or that 
there would need to be an over-reliance on less skilled staff. This could, in turn, considerably 
moderate any favourable impacts on child development. A more carefully phased plan would be of 
benefit, and one with a clearer focus on quality early years education rather than childcare. 
On schools, the Liberal Democrat funding proposals are less than Labour and would leave per pupil 
funding little changed from the 2009-2010 level by 2022-23. Their pledge on school funding is not 
materially different from the Conservative proposals – by 2022-23, they would have increased the 
schools budget by only around 1 per cent more than the Conservatives. 
Surprisingly, for a party that proposed the Pupil Premium, the Liberal Democrats assume that it will 
not be uprated for inflation – which means it will decline by 15 per cent in real terms by 2022-23 
(versus 2014-15). The Liberal Democrats also say they “will increase teacher numbers by 20,000”, 
but this is misleading – teacher numbers aren’t controlled by government but by the schools which 
are given the budgets.  
The Liberal Democrats have also pledged to extend free school meals to all children in primary 
education and to all secondary school children whose families receive Universal Credit which they 
                                                          
3 In 2019-20 prices. The Liberal Democrat’s costing document presents cash amounts in 2024-25. 
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estimate would cost £1,160m in 2024-25. Again, once we account for increases in staffing costs, we 
estimate that the likely cost would be £180m more than the Liberal Democrats have budgeted. 
Like Labour, the Liberal Democrats propose to end national tests in primary schools and to replace 
Ofsted – though the purpose of the latter reform is far from clear. Evidence suggests that robust 
accountability can help improve attainment, and there are risks that these steps could lead to worse 
value for money and a reduced focus on improved attainment and tackling poorly performing 
schools. Vulnerable children’s interests might not be served by such changes. 
More positively, the Liberal Democrats propose a series of policies to improve mental health and 
wellbeing, as well as out of school support. There is growing evidence that such policies, if effectively 
delivered, can have an important impact on well being. 
On higher education, the Liberal Democrats have few proposals. A new ‘Skills Wallet’ for lifelong 
learning is proposed, but with limited policy detail. This could have a useful impact on skills, but 
there could also be high deadweight costs. In contrast to the Labour package, the Liberal Democrats 
appear to be proposing to spend relatively little on higher education and have committed instead to 
a review of funding in this area, despite an independent review having only just taken place. 
The Liberal Democrats make a large commitment on extra education spending. But some of this 
comes from an assumed ‘remain bonus’ from staying in the EU and from uncertain revenue sources 
such as measures to counter tax avoidance. There are therefore some risks in relation to these 
revenue sources. 
In conclusion, there are some Liberal Democrat pledges that could positively impact on attainment 
and the disadvantaged gap – particularly on early years education and wider child support e.g. 
mental health services. But on schools and colleges, there are few policies which would impact 
materially on attainment and the gap, and the proposals to reduce accountability and allow real cuts 
in the pupil premium are likely to have a negative impact. While the Liberal Democrat pledge to 
spend more on the early years is significant and potentially very beneficial, a more carefully phased 
plan is needed, along with more action to build on this in the later phases of education. 
The Green Party 
The Green Party’s manifesto sets out a series of aspirational policies, some of which lack sufficient 
detail to properly analyse. 
The party has committed to providing 35 hours of free early education from nine months onwards. It 
is not, however, clear how this will be funded and whether universal childcare from as early as nine 
months will help to improve child outcomes or narrow the disadvantage gap.  
As with Labour and the Liberal Democrats, the Green Party proposes significant reforms to school 
accountability and inspection. Again, these reforms risk lowering rather than raising standards. 
Like Labour, the Green Party would abolish tuition fees, a policy which would be unlikely to improve 
participation amongst disadvantaged students and would have little or no impact on educational 
outcomes. 
The Green Party’s manifesto, overall, is not rooted in the best available evidence of what works to 
improve overall attainment and narrow the disadvantage gap. 
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The Brexit Party 
The Brexit Party manifesto has very few proposals relating to education. These include an expansion 
of the academies and free schools programme, abolishing student loan interest and scrapping the 
apprenticeship levy. Assuming that the party maintains current government policy in all other areas, 
there is no evidence that their policies will either improve attainment or narrow the disadvantage 
gap. 
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Introduction  
The 2019 General Election has been driven by the United Kingdom’s departure from the European 
Union. Polling carried out immediately prior to the campaign showed it as the top-issue of the 
electorate by some margin – over two-thirds of people placed it amongst their top three issues.4  
Domestic policy areas such as education, housing, welfare, and the economy each polled under 30 
per cent. But education is still a high public priority, and it is crucially important that policy-makers 
and the public do not lose sight of these important domestic issues. 
We have a school system that has been facing challenges in teacher recruitment and retention, as 
well as funding pressures that have seen schools facing real terms falls in per pupil funding of around 
8 per cent over the last decade. The government has promised significant extra investment – 
equivalent to an additional £7bn a year in today’s prices by 2022-23 – this would return funding to 
2010 levels. But this still means the school system in England has faced a 13-year funding squeeze. 
Our annual report, published in July 2019, highlighted just how far we are from an equitable 
education system. By the time they complete secondary school, pupils from low income 
backgrounds are 18 months behind their more affluent peers. Progress in closing that gap has 
stalled, and there are some indications that it might be about to go into reverse. Forty per cent of 
this gap is evident before children even start school. 
International comparisons show that England’s high attaining pupils are on a par with some of the 
highest performing countries in the world. Our biggest challenge is therefore a long tail of low 
attainment that is correlated with economic disadvantage, special educational needs, and particular 
ethnic groups. 
This project aims to increase public understanding of the key challenges in education – framed in 
particular around the inequitable nature of education in England – and provide an independent, 
evidence-based assessment of the extent to which each of the main parties have committed to 
meeting those challenges.  
Report structure 
The report is structured around eight priority areas for education in England: 
1. Early years: improving access, quality and funding, particularly for the most disadvantaged. 
2. School accountability: including the role of Ofsted and performance measures and 
addressing the impact of accountability measures on inclusion, exclusion and curriculum 
breadth and choices. 
3. Distribution of school funding: ensuring that the distribution of school funding reflects the 
challenging contexts of schools. 
4. Teachers: addressing the challenges of recruitment, retention, workload and distribution of 
teachers. 
5. Access to good schools: delivering good school places and fair admissions processes. 
                                                          
4 YouGov, ‘Which issues will decide the general election’, (November 2019). 
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6. Post-16 education (including technical and vocational education): ensuring sufficient 
funding, quality and access, and reducing segregation. 
7. Post-18 education: recognising the diversity of options and funding between bachelor and 
sub-bachelor degrees, changes to tuition fees and maintenance loans. 
8. Children and young people’s mental health: Ensuring that young people have the necessary 
access to children and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS) and support in schools. 
Each priority area includes a summary of the challenge, a discussion of the latest relevant analysis, 
research, and policy developments and then highlights what government needs to consider and 
objectives for any incoming government. We then go on to assess party proposals against these 
objectives and the extent to which they are likely to meet them.  
Coverage  
As education is a devolved issue, and the UK Parliament only has control over education in England, 
this project considers policy implications for England only. As such we have restricted our analysis to 
parties seeking election for constituencies in England.  
The uncertainty around the make-up of the next parliament, coupled with a large number of 
independent candidates and smaller parties, has meant that we have had to set conditions for which 
parties are included. We have worked to the principle of including any party that might reasonably 
have a direct influence, either as a governing party or as part of an alliance, over government policy 
in the next parliament. We include any party which:  
▪ was polling at least 10 per cent in the Britain Elects poll tracker at the point of dissolution;5 or 
▪ had at least one seat (in England) in parliament at the point of dissolution and has at least 10 
candidates (in England) standing in this election. 
The parties included are therefore: Conservative; Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green, and Brexit. We 
assess policies where the party has made a clear public statement either through a manifesto or 
through its official website or social media accounts. In the absence of a clear policy statement, we 
have assumed a continuation of existing policy.  
 
                                                          
5 Britain Elects polling, Wednesday 6th November 2019. 
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Priority 1: The early years 
Our research has found that around 40 per cent of the disadvantage gap at age 16 is already evident 
by age 5, with disadvantaged children being, on average, over 4 months behind their more affluent 
peers. For more vulnerable children the gap is even more stark: children with SEND without a 
statement or Education and Health Care Plan (EHCP), and therefore likely considered as having less 
acute needs, are almost 10 months behind their peers by age 5.6 
The biggest single influence on a child’s development is their parental background and associated 
home environment, one of the areas of education policy hardest to impact directly. A high-quality 
early years education is a vital tool in starting to close the gap. 
The current landscape 
Subsidies and entitlements 
The UK spends a comparatively small proportion of its GDP on early years education, spending 0.5 
per cent compared to an OECD average of 0.8 per cent. UK spending is skewed towards private 
funding, with public spending accounting for 66 per cent of total spend, compared to an OECD 
average of 83 per cent, making it one of the most privately funded systems within the OECD.7 
Considering the importance of early years, it is essential that there is equitable access to provision 
and that any subsidies are appropriately targeted. Currently the entitlement to free early years 
provision is dependent on the age of the child and the household circumstances. 
Figure 1.1: Existing childcare entitlements by age group  
Age Group Entitlement 
Two-year-olds Children whose parents are on certain income-related benefits or children who are 
currently or have been looked after or have special educational needs 
15 hours a week (38 weeks a year or equivalent) 
Otherwise 
No entitlement 
Three and four-
year-olds 
Children where both parents (or only parent if they are in a single parent household) earn 
above the equivalent to 16 hours work at minimum wage but below £100,000 a year 
30 hours a week (38 weeks a year or equivalent) 
Otherwise 
15 hours a week (38 weeks a year) 
 
Combined with other childcare subsidies, including tax free childcare, government support for early 
years provision is more beneficial to higher income families.8 It is also possible that the larger total 
funding associated with a child on the 30-hour entitlement means that these children are more 
                                                          
6 Jo Hutchinson et al, ‘Education in England: Annual Report 2019’, (July 2019)       
7 OECD, 'Starting Strong 2017', (June 2017)  
8 Kitty Stewart and Jane Waldfogel, ‘CLOSING GAPS EARLY: The Role of Early Years Policy in Promoting Social 
Mobility in England’, (September 2017) 
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‘popular’ with providers and so ‘crowd out’ those on the 15-hour entitlement who are likely to be 
from less well-off households.9 
The 30-hour entitlement was intended to increase work incentives and reduce financial burdens on 
working parents, by lowering the cost to parents of entering full time work. A Department for 
Education evaluation found, however, that only 26 per cent of mothers reported working more 
hours after the roll out of the 30-hour entitlement, and only two per cent reported having entered 
work.10  
Though varying by geographic area, many providers find government funding rates to be insufficient, 
leading them to pursue a cross-subsidisation model. Here they charge higher rates for hours not 
covered by the government or charge for extras such as lunch at above cost price.11 This reduces 
how much the entitlement incentivises work and may result in shifting the cost burden between 
parents with different working patterns or with children of different ages. Financial viability is 
particularly important with 180 nurseries and pre-schools closing per month.12  
Workforce and settings 
For children who do access early years provision, we know that a qualified and skilled workforce is a 
key component of high quality provision.13 Despite this, the early years workforce is poorly qualified 
and low-paid. While 93 per cent of school teachers have a degree, this figure falls to 25 per cent for 
early years workers.14 In addition, the proportion of early years nurses and assistants that have a 
Level 3 qualification has fluctuated in recent years and currently stands at 68 per cent.14 
As maintained nursery schools and nursery classes in maintained schools have a requirement for 
degrees among their workers, and private, voluntary and independent (PVI) nursery schools do not, 
degree-educated EY workers are heavily concentrated within maintained providers. 
A qualified and skilled workforce is vital in in ensuring early years provision is of high quality, with 
formal degree education and content specific to an early years environment being useful, though 
there is likely to be some variation in the quality of early years degrees. Furthermore, upskilling can 
professionalise the workforce, increasing salary and social status.  
As well as being low-qualified, the early years workforce is also ageing and faces an increasingly 
uncertain future. In 2018, around 90,000 early years workers were 55 years old or above. This means 
a significant number are likely to exit the workforce in the next decade and little indication that 
there are sufficient numbers of younger workers to replace them.14 
The sector also employs more than 37,000 EU nationals, totalling 5.1 per cent of all workers. This is a 
similar contribution to EU nationals in the NHS (63,000 workers and 5.6 per cent of staff).14 With net 
EU migration levels dropping, this could be an additional squeeze upon the sector. 
                                                          
9 Avinash Akhal, ‘The Impact of Recent Government Policies on Early Years Provision’, (January 2019) 
10 Department for Education, ‘30 Hours Free Childcare: Evaluation of the National Rollout’, (September 2018) 
11 Hannah Richardson, ‘Parents Subsidise “free” Nursery Scheme BBC News', (January 2018)    
12 HMCI Letter to Tracy Brabin MP, 23rd October 2019. Based on data from 2018-19. In addition, an average of 
390 childminders leave each month. 
13 Sara Bonetti, ‘What Does Quality Early Years Provision Look Like?’, (August 2018)  
14 Sara Bonetti, ‘The Early Years Workforce in England’, (January 2019) 
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There are no signs that this lack of qualified staff will be addressed soon. The sector has suffered a 
pay reduction of nearly 5 per cent in real terms in the years 2013 – 2018 (despite working women 
overall seeing rises of 2.5 per cent) and pay is now virtually the same as that of hairdressers and 
beauticians. Early years workers are now experiencing high financial insecurity, with 44.5 per cent 
claiming state benefits or tax credits.14 Around one in four early years workers cited ‘unsatisfactory 
pay’ as the main reason for leaving the sector.15 
The lack of parity between PVIs and the maintained sector further reduces the incentive for workers 
to stay within the PVI sector. This is both for degree-educated workers, who are incentivised to work 
within a graduate workforce in the maintained sector and for non-degree educated workers who 
could be earning more outside of the early years sector entirely.15 
What should a new government do?  
Education research suggests that policies should: 
▪ include an appropriately funded long-term workforce strategy, which addresses 
recruitment and retention issues, and provides incentives and opportunities for current and 
new staff to increase qualification and skill levels; 
▪ focus on addressing the regressive elements of the current funding system and 
entitlements, to ensure that additional resources help to close the disadvantage gap already 
present by age 5; and 
▪ recognise the existing financial strain on the early years sector and commit to ensuring that 
any expansion in the provision do not increase this further. 
Manifesto commitments 
Manifesto commitments for the early years focus heavily on extending free hours for 2, 3 and 4-year 
olds and investing in upskilling the workforce – but only amongst some of the parties. There is a 
clear distinction in the eligibility criteria and provision levels of offers between the Conservative and 
Brexit Parties and the Labour, Liberal Democrat and Green Parties.  
Workforce 
The Conservative manifesto makes only one suggestion in this area; that its new £1bn childcare fund 
will create more “high quality and affordable childcare”, but does not give any detail about 
qualification levels or training offers within the sector. 
Labour’s manifesto states a commitment to a transition towards a “qualified graduate-led 
workforce”, while maintaining efforts to allow current staff to upskill on the job. It also has a 
significant recruitment target of nearly 150,000 new workers. Labour has also committed to 
introducing a national pay scale in the early years, which is designed to drive up pay amongst the 
predominantly female workforce. There remains, however, a lack of detail about what such a pay 
scale would look like, including whether it would differentiate between maintained providers and 
PVIs, and between qualified teacher status and early years teacher status qualified staff.  
The Liberal Democrat manifesto commits to upskilling current staff in early years-specific 
qualifications. There is a lack of detail around how this will be funded, however, especially when the 
                                                          
15 Avinash Akhal, ‘The Early Years Workforce: A Comparison with Retail Workers’, (April 2019)           
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party is committing to a large increase in the number of hours of provision. They also set a long-term 
goal of having at least one graduate in each setting, although little reference is made to timescales, 
funding or how this policy will be implemented, considering this is likely to be an ambitious target 
for PVI providers.  
Neither the Green Party nor the Brexit Party make reference to the quality or qualifications of the 
early years workforce.  
Children’s centres 
The Labour manifesto commits to reversing cuts to Sure Start and creating an expanded service 
‘Sure Start Plus’. This new universal service will be aimed at children under two and located 
throughout the country. The Liberal Democrat manifesto commits to a £1bn investment in Children’s 
Centres, which aim to “support families and tackle inequalities in children’s health, development and 
life chances”.  
Both proposals represent an attempt to reduce the health and educational inequalities which begin 
at an early age and then widen throughout the lifetime of a child. Their effectiveness is likely to 
depend on their ability to provide high-quality services and ensure that they have high rates of use, 
particularly among disadvantaged children and those with SEND. 
Entitlements 
As the table below shows, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party have set out specific 
changes to early years entitlements spanning from 9 months to age 5. 
The Conservative Party has not made any specific commitment in relation to increased hours or age 
groups, but has committed to creating a £1bn fund which would be used to expand both early years 
provision and school-aged childcare. 
The Brexit Party has made no reference to the early years. 
20 
 
Figure 1.2: Early years entitlements by age and party 
Supply side subsidies only (does not include policies or commitments relating to tax incentives or 
maternity, paternity or shared parental leave) 
Age Group Under 
one 
years 
old 
One year olds Two year olds Three and four year 
olds 
Current policy  15 hours a week for 38 weeks 
(or equivalent) free for 
children whose parents are on 
certain income-related 
benefits or children who are 
currently or have been looked 
after or have special 
educational needs. 
15 hours free for 38 
weeks per year for all 
children. 
30 hours free for those 
whose parents meet 
certain working 
requirements. 
Conservative An additional £1bn fund to create more high quality and affordable childcare, including 
before and after school and during the school holidays 
Labour  Work towards 
extending 
childcare 
provision for one-
year-olds 
Provide 30 hours a week free for all children aged two 
to four. No mention of changing number of weeks from 
38. 
Additional hours to be provided at rates staggered by 
household income. 
Liberal 
Democrat 
Provide 35 hours free for 48 
weeks per year from 9 
months to 2 years for 
children whose parents are 
in work. 
Provide 35 hours free for 48 weeks per year for all 
children aged two to four. 
Green Provide 35 hours free per week for all children from age 9 months. 
No mention of changing number of weeks from 38. 
Brexit No mention in manifesto. 
 
Funding rates 
Changes are also proposed to the hourly rates paid by government for publicly funded early years 
places, an area of importance for the long-term sustainability of the early years sector in light of the 
increasing financial strain under which some providers currently operate.16 
Without an increase in funding rates, there are several possible outcomes. Quality may fall if 
providers are forced to further reduce the resources directed at hiring and retaining qualified staff 
and in delivering continuous professional development. Alternatively, providers may pursue 
increased cross-subsidisation, which in turn could lead to increasing variation in the quality of 
                                                          
16 CEEDA, ‘About Early Years: summer snapshot’, (September 2017)  
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provision, particularly between settings with a higher proportion of disadvantaged children and 
those with a lower proportion. Finally, an increasing numbers of early years providers could face 
closure.  
Increasing funding rates is likely to be an expensive policy, especially when combined with increases 
in the number of hours which are government funded. However, a revision of the funding rates or 
some other changes to the current funding system is likely to be necessary if current concerns 
around the sector’s financial viability are to be addressed. This is especially important when parties 
are committing to increase the qualification levels within the sector or increasing the proportion of 
hours provided at government rates by changing the entitlements system.  
The Conservative, Green and Brexit parties make no reference to changing the early years funding 
rates. 
The Labour and Liberal Democrat manifestos state they will increase funding. The IFS estimate this 
increase in funding is an increase in average funding rates for two-year-olds to £7.22 per hour under 
the Liberal Democrats and £9 under Labour by 2023-24 (in 2023-24 prices), from a current average 
of £5.44 in 2019-20. The IFS also estimate the increase in minimum hourly rates in 2023-24 for three 
and four-year-olds to £5.60 under Labour and £5.36 under the Liberal Democrats (again both in 
2023-24 prices) compared to the current funding of £4.30 per hour in current prices.  
Combining the information on proposed changes to hourly rates with changes to the entitlements, it 
is possible to model the effect of each party’s policies, in terms of the change in funding amount 
each eligible child would receive in the year 2023-24 having accounted for take-up rates (note, this 
does not include funding for the Early Years Pupil Premium). For parties that have not suggested a 
change in rates, we consider a range of costings, representing the cases where they rise with 
inflation and where they remain constant (and so lose value in real terms).17 A full description of our 
methodology is in Appendix 1.  
                                                          
17 For the two-year-old entitlement, ‘disadvantaged’ refers to children whose parents are in certain forms of 
income support benefit and children who are or have been looked after or have special educational needs and 
disabilities. For three and four-year olds, and for the new under-two entitlement, ‘disadvantaged’ refers to 
children whose parents do not pass threshold relating to being in work. Whilst this not passing the threshold 
for being in work does not exactly correspond to disadvantage, it does confirm that at least one parent is 
earning a low salary of less than approximately £7,000 a year (it is reasonable to exclude children in 
households where one parent earns over £100,000 as this is a very small number of children).   
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Figure 1.3: Average funding amount each eligible child would receive through the entitlement in 2023-24 
having accounted for take-up rates. We have assumed that the rates payable for those under two years old 
are the same as the two year old rates18 This considers only supply side spending (not benefits and tax 
incentives, etc) 
Average annual 
expenditure 
per eligible 
child in 2023-24 
(2019-20 
prices) 
Current/Conservative Labour Liberal 
Democrats 
Green 
9 months to 2 
years 
NA NA Working: £7,730 
Non-working: £0 
Working: £4,611 
- £4,978 
Non-working: 
£4,611 - £4,978 
Two years Disadvantaged: £1,717 
- £1,854 
Non-disadvantaged: 
£0 
Disadvantaged: 
£6,539  
Non-disadvantaged: 
£6,539 
Disadvantaged: 
£7,730 
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£7,730 
Disadvantaged: 
£4,611 - £4,978  
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£4,611 - £4,978 
As IFS data gives minimum funding commitments made by parties, in Figure 1.4 we consider the 
minimum amount of spending per eligible child. 
Figure 1.4: Minimum funding amount each eligible child would receive through the entitlement in 2023-24 
having accounted for take-up rates.18 This considers only supply-side spending (not benefits and tax 
incentives, etc) 
Average 
annual 
expenditure 
per eligible 
child in 2023-
24 (2019-20 
prices) 
Conservative/ 
Current Policy 
 
Labour Liberal Democrats Green 
 Working: £3,563 - 
£3,846 
Non-working: £1,781 
- £1,923 
Working: £4,640 
Non-working: 
£4,640 
 
Working: £6,545 
Non-working: £6,545 
Working: £4,157 - 
£4,487 
Non-working: £4,157 
- £4,487 
As shown in the table, the increase to early years funding under Labour and the Liberal Democrats is 
significant both in absolute terms and relative to the Conservative proposals. If delivered, a spending 
of this scale has the potential to improve significantly the quality and pay of the early years 
workforce and put early years per-pupil spending higher than school spending. However, building 
the workforce capacity and quality will take time and there is therefore a risk that while spending 
can rise quickly, improving overall quality will take much longer. 
Overall assessment 
The Conservative party policy is notable for its lack of detail on any of the priorities facing the early 
years. Unlike any of the other parties, it commits to an expansion of school-aged childcare. The 
Conservative party’s approach appears to be driven largely by childcare and cost of living 
                                                          
18 In other words, it is the average across all of the eligible child population not just those who take up the 
entitlement. Excludes the Early Years Pupil Premium. 
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motivations, although as the government’s own evaluation of the 30 hour entitlement pilot found, a 
childcare-based approach to provision for under-fives appears to have an impact on increasing 
working hours but only a small effect on overall unemployment rates.19 The Conservative Party’s lack 
of reference to building a high-quality workforce, introducing a more progressive entitlement system 
and increasing funding rates raises questions over the stability and sustainability of the early years 
sector and suggests that their policies in this area will do little to close the existing gaps. 
Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats propose significant reform to both early years entitlements 
and funding, and would bring early years spending per child close to (or higher than, in the case of 
the Liberal Democrats) school spending. 
Labour and the Liberal Democrat parties also recognise the importance of upskilling the early years 
workforce. However, both parties have very ambitious and expensive plans which rely not only on 
securing the resource, but also the capacity of the sector, to build and sustain a better qualified 
workforce. If delivered, plans to upskill the workforce and to make entitlements universal and not 
contingent on work status are likely to help to narrow the disadvantage gap at age 5. Making 
provision for three and four-year olds universal could also reduce the regressive nature of the 
current system; making the two-year-old entitlement universal may increase take-up rates among 
disadvantaged children.20 The Liberal Democrat policy to deliver only free provision for children 
under two years to those in families where both parents work may provide some help as a cost of 
living policy, but it is unlikely to target spending towards children who have the greatest 
development need. 
The Green Party’s only proposal in this area is to increase the free entitlement to 35 hours from the 
age of nine months. Without further detail of how this would be delivered, the impact of this policy 
is unclear. 
The Brexit Party has made no commitment to changing policies in the early years.  
 
  
                                                          
19 Department for Education, 'Evaluation of the first year of the national rollout of 30 hours free 
childcare', (September 2018) 
20 W. Steven Barnett ‘Universal and Targeted Approaches to Preschool Education in the United States’, 
(February 2015) 
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Priority 2: School accountability 
The school system in England is underpinned by a system of accountability in which schools are 
compared through performance tables and Ofsted inspections. By international standards, England’s 
system is defined as one of high autonomy, with high accountability (OECD, 2015). 
The accountability system that we have today is not simply a vehicle by which the public (primarily 
parents) are able to judge the performance of individual schools. It also: provides the key data on 
which the government can identify poorly performing schools which are then subject to direct 
intervention including, if a maintained school, forced academisation; provides the mechanism by 
which the government of the day can shape the qualification and subject choices of schools and 
pupils; and gives one way in which the success of overall government policy is measured (for 
example, the proportion of pupils in good and outstanding schools). 
We therefore have an accountability system with multiple different users, with multiple different 
purposes. But the system can also have unintended consequences on schools, being associated with 
issues around teacher recruitment and retention, and potentially acting as a disincentive to inclusive 
education.  
The current landscape 
Importance for school standards 
International evidence suggests that school accountability which allows the direct comparison of 
schools has a positive impact on pupil outcomes, with standardised testing achieving better results 
than localised or subjective information.21 The removal of formalised testing also risks introducing 
biased assessments – by gender, ethnicity, special educational needs, and socio-economic factors.22  
Research suggests that the removal of published information about individual schools – such as 
through the school performance tables – could lead to a fall in school standards. The abolition of 
performance tables in Wales led to a “marked reduction in school effectiveness”.23 This was 
particularly the case for schools at the lower end of the performance distribution and so is likely to 
be felt disproportionately by pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds.  
Use of accountability by parents 
One of the key reasons for the system of public accountability for schools is its role in school choice, 
allowing parents to compare the performance of schools. Less than half of parents nominate their 
nearest secondary school as their first preference, and families for whom the nearest school has low 
                                                          
21 Annika B. Bergbauer, Eric Hanushek, Ludger Woessmann, ‘Testing with accountability improves student 
achievement’, (September 2018) 
22 Tammy Campbell, ‘Stereotyped at Seven? Biases in Teacher Judgement of Pupils’ Ability and Attainment’, 
(July 2015) 
23 Simon Burgess et al, ‘A natural experiment in school accountability: the impact of school performance 
information on pupil progress and sorting’, (October 2013) 
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attainment as reported in school performance tables are the least likely to nominate their nearest 
school as their first preference.24 
Ofsted’s most recent Parental Annual Survey found that 68 per cent of parents believed that Ofsted 
provided a valuable source of information of education standards in their area.25 More broadly, the 
vast majority (84 per cent) had read an Ofsted report at some stage. 
However, some felt that the report was redundant as they would send their child to their preffered 
school anyway. In fact, despite their long-standing status as a key indicator of school performance 
for parents, there is surprisingly little evidence on the impact of inspection outcomes on parental 
choice. The perceived performance of a school does appear to affect the extent to which parents 
involve themselves with their child’s education. For example, if school performance increases, 
parents become less likely to help with homework (though the converse is not true).26 
Relationship with teacher retention 
A poor Ofsted judgement can have serious implications for schools, not only in terms of direct 
intervention in the school, but also amongst the teaching workforce. Lower Ofsted ratings in schools 
are associated with higher rates of teachers moving to other schools, or leaving the profession 
altogether.27 For example, in 2015, around 10 per cent of teachers in primary schools rated as 
outstanding left the profession, in schools rated as inadequate it was over 15 per cent. Whilst not 
necessarily causal, a school being downgraded to inadequate is associated with a 3.4 percentage 
point increase in teacher turnover.28 Of course, such staff restructuring may be part of trying to 
improve standards in the school.  
Fairness  
The fact that there are high stakes associated with Ofsted means that it is important that their 
judgements are fair. However, schools with more disadvantaged pupils have been less likely to be 
rated “outstanding” while schools with low disadvantage and high prior attainment are more likely 
to receive positive judgements from Ofsted.29 This holds even when controlling for the progress 
pupils in the school made relative to pupils with similar prior attainment.  
While the government has signalled its intention to remove the exemption for outstanding schools, 
no significant action has been taken to address the apparent bias against schools with disadvantaged 
cohorts.30 Ofsted has recently implemented its new inspection framework which will focus more on 
curriculum intention and breadth, than attainment outcomes. However, the new framework does 
                                                          
24 Simon Burgess, Ellen Greaves, & Anna Vignoles, ‘Understanding parental choices of secondary school in 
England using national administrative data’, (October 2017) 
25 YouGov, ‘Annual parents survey 2018, parents awareness and perceptions of Ofsted’, (April 2019)  
26 Iftikhar Hussein et al, ‘How do parents respond to Ofsted reports?’, (2019) 
27 Jack Worth et al., ‘Teacher Workforce Dynamics in England: Nurturing, Supporting and Valuing Teachers’, 
(March 2018) 
28 Sam Sims, ‘High-Stakes Accountability and Teacher Turnover: How do Different School Inspection Judgements 
Affect Teachers’ Decisions to Leave Their School?’ (October 2016) 
29 Jo Hutchinson, ‘School inspection in England: is there room to improve?’, (November 2017) 
30 Department for Education, ‘New drive to continue boosting standards in schools’, (September 2019) 
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not fully acknowledge the multi-faceted causes of poor behaviour amongst disadvantaged and 
vulnerable pupils.31 
“Progress 8” is the government’s headline measure for assessing performance in secondary schools. 
Progress 8 measures the progress that pupils make between the end of Key Stage 2 and the end of 
Key Stage 4 and benchmarks schools against the national average. While this is a better measure 
than the previous 5+ A*-C threshold measure, it only considers the context of pupils in terms of their 
Key Stage 2 scores and not other factors that are widely understood to be associated with education 
performance, including the prevalence of special educational needs, ethnicity and poverty. Because 
pupils who have one or more characteristics which make them more vulnerable are likely to make 
less progress than their peers, Progress 8 benefits schools with more affluent intakes. 
Implications for subject and qualification choices 
Both Progress 8 and the English Baccalaureate (EBacc) require pupils to take certain subjects and can 
therefore limit their opportunities to take others. While Progress 8 is the measure by which 
government assesses school performance, the proportion of pupils entering into the EBacc also 
features on school performance tables. Taken together, Progress 8 and the EBacc have attracted 
criticism that pupils are being forced into taking more “academic” subjects and dropping more 
creative subjects, including the arts.32  
Between 2010 and 2014 the proportion of pupils entering at least one arts subject increased from 
55.6 per cent to 57.1 per cent, but by 2016 it had fallen to 53.5 – its lowest point in a decade. It is 
not necessarily accountability alone that led to a fall in the study of the arts, our research suggests 
that the fall was also associated with financial pressures.33  
Implications for inclusion 
There are also concerns amongst the sector and parents that accountability measures are not only 
affecting the curriculum, but also the inclusion of pupils, particularly the most vulnerable. The 
practice of ‘off-rolling’, where pupils are moved out of a school without a formal exclusion, has been 
under scrutiny for some time now though there has been a lack of data to show precisely how often 
it is happening and where it is taking place.  
Once apparently legitimate, family-driven, moves out of a school, are taken into account, around 
61,000 pupils from the 2017 GCSE cohort, equivalent to one in ten pupils, experienced an 
unexplained exit during their time in secondary school. 34 Around three quarters of these moves 
were experienced by vulnerable pupils, predominantly those in social care, those with mental health 
needs, those with special educational needs and disabilities, those pupils living in poverty, and those 
from Black ethnic backgrounds (see Figure 2.1).  
                                                          
31 Jo Hutchinson, ‘Improvements and errors: Ofsted’s new framework is difficult to grade’, (May 2019) 
32 Eleanor Busby, ‘Decline in creative subjects at GCSE prompts fears that arts industry could be damaged’, 
(August 2018) 
33 Rebecca Johnes, ‘Entries to arts subjects at Key Stage 4’, (September 2017) 
34 Jo Hutchinson and Whitney Crenna-Jennings, ‘Unexplained Pupil Exits from Schools: Further Analysis and 
Data by Multi-Academy Trust and Local Authority’ (October 2019) 
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of the 2017 Key Stage 4 cohort who had at least one unexplained exit by pupil 
characteristics35 
 
It is important to note, however, that challenges to inclusion do not arise from accountability alone 
and recent trends could be because of a range of pressures on schools including funding, teacher 
recruitment and retention and weakened local authority support services. 
What should a new government do? 
Education research suggests that policies should: 
▪ recognise that an autonomous school system needs robust and intelligent accountability 
systems to help drive improved outcomes; and 
▪ ensure that accountability systems take the vulnerability of the school's pupil intake into 
account and do not incentivise the removal of pupils whose attainment might otherwise be 
poor. 
Manifesto commitments  
Some of the manifestos include significant changes to the public accountability of schools in England 
and provide a clear dividing line between the parties. This includes the abolition of Ofsted, after 
being a feature of the school system for nearly thirty years, and a move away from statutory 
assessment in primary schools.  
Testing and school performance tables 
The Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, and the Green Party propose abolishing statutory end of 
key stage tests in primary schools. Labour would refocus assessment on pupil progress. The Liberal 
Democrats would replace tests with a formal, moderated, teacher assessment at the end of each 
phase and “some lighter-touch testing”. The removal of formalised testing risks introducing biased 
assessments – by gender, ethnicity, special educational needs, and socio-economic factors.36  
Neither the Conservative Party or the Brexit Party propose any changes to assessment.  
                                                          
35 Note that LAC refers to ‘looked after children’, CIN refers to ‘children in need’. 
36 Tammy Campbell, ‘Stereotyped at Seven? Biases in Teacher Judgement of Pupils’ Ability and Attainment’, 
(July 2015) 
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The Labour Party aim to tackle the practice of “off-rolling” in school performance tables, where 
pupils are moved out of a school without a formal exclusion. Labour say they will do this by making 
schools accountable for pupils who leave their rolls. Attempts to address this are welcome, however 
the proposed approach may also introduce perverse incentives into the accountability system. For 
example, one option would be to weight pupil outcomes by the length of time that they were in the 
school.37 But this does risk incentivising schools to remove pupils early during secondary education, 
or to not admit vulnerable pupils altogether.  
The Liberal Democrats would replace performance tables with a broader set of indicators including 
pupil wellbeing. At this stage there is no indication of how that data would be collected, though it is 
likely to place additional burdens on schools. Attempts have been made in the past to provide a 
broader picture for school performance, for example the ‘school profile’ introduced by the 
Education Act 2005.38 However, this did not appear to be widely used, with nearly three-quarters of 
schools not updating it in a given year.39  
The Liberal Democrats would also end the EBacc as performance measure as part of their support 
for the arts in schools. However, the relationship between arts entries and reforms to the 
performance tables is complex.  
The Green Party would end the publication of performance tables altogether. Given that the Labour 
Party have also proposed the end of National Curriculum testing in primary schools this would 
suggest that primary school performance tables might also end under a Labour government. 
Research suggests that this could lead to a fall in school standards. Neither the Conservative Party or 
the Brexit Party make any reference to school performance tables and so we assume that the 
current arrangements will remain. Overall, where parties have generally implied that performance 
tables would remain in some form, efforts to address the unfairness of performance tables measures 
are lacking.  
Inspection 
Ofsted currently inspects 6,100 schools a year in a combination of short inspections (3,800) that last 
one day and full inspections (2,300) that last two days.40 The Conservative Party manifesto re-stated 
their support for Ofsted, saying that it is not only important for standards but also behaviour. 
However, Ofsted themselves have in the past said that they do not necessarily believe inspection 
outcomes fully reflect standards of behaviour.41 Since the publication of their manifesto, the 
Conservative Party have pledged to increase the number of days that Ofsted spends in schools with 
an increased focus on behaviour and wider wellbeing, at an estimated cost of £10m a year.42 
Both the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats propose abolishing Ofsted and replacing it with a 
new body – in the case of the Liberal Democrats an HM Inspector of Schools. However, neither is 
                                                          
37 Rebecca Allen, ‘Schools should be accountable for all pupils they teach’, (March 2017) 
38 Education Act 2005, Part 4, Maintained Schools, Section 104 
39 Response to a Freedom of Information request published on www.whatdotheyknow.com, (October 2010)  
40 Ofsted ‘State funded schools inspections and outcomes: monthly management information (2017/18)’, 
(December 2018) 
41 Fraser Whieldon, ‘Harford: Ofsted has ‘real issues’ inspecting behaviour’, (June 2019) 
42 Richard Adams, ‘Conservative pledge to boost Ofsted’s power to inspect schools’, (November 2019) 
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proposing the ending of independent inspection of schools and both seem to be unclear as to what 
the functions of these new bodies would be and how they would differ from those of Ofsted.  
The Liberal Democrats further propose inspection on a three-year cycle, increasing the number of 
inspections by around one thousand each year. If such inspections were of a similar length to current 
inspections then they would come at a cost of around £8m a year.43 Neither the Labour Party or the 
Liberal Democrats have provided an estimate of the cost of closing Ofsted and establishing a new 
body in its place. 
The Green Party would abolish Ofsted and replace it with a collaborative system of assessing and 
supporting schools locally. A challenge here may be the variation between different areas in terms of 
high performing schools. The distribution of high performing secondary schools has become more 
geographically uneven in recent years, with a 2017 study finding that there were some local 
authority areas that did not have any high performing secondary schools.44 In other words, local 
schools may not necessarily have the capacity themselves to aid school improvement. The Labour 
Party proposal of peer to peer support sitting at a regional level may go some way to address this. 
Curriculum 
Both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party propose an arts pupil premium – the former would 
target this at secondary aged pupils, the former at primary aged pupils. The Liberal Democrats say 
that they would protect the arts, though no further details are given beyond removing the EBacc 
from performance measures. The Conservative Party would also provide additional funding for 
physical education. The Liberal Democrats propose establishing an independent panel for any future 
changes to curriculum. The Labour Party say that they would carry out a review of the curriculum.  
Overall assessment 
The manifesto commitments from the opposition parties suggest significant changes to school 
accountability but they are not necessarily rooted in reforms that would lead to higher standards. 
The abolition of standardised tests by the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, and the Green Party 
would run counter to evidence that suggests that they are more beneficial to pupil outcomes than 
locally administered tests or subjective outcomes. This is particularly the case for the Green Party 
which would abolish school performance tables despite evidence that suggests this would lower 
standards, particularly in the lowest performing schools. 
The Liberal Democrat proposals to move towards teacher assessments do come at the risk of 
increased bias in pupil outcomes, particularly by ethnicity and for low income groups. 
Announcements prior to the election that the Labour Party would abolish Ofsted generated 
headlines. However, their manifesto commitments, and those of the Liberal Democrats, do not 
mean an end of school inspection. It is, however, unclear at this stage what those new inspections 
would look like and how their operation would differ from that currently carried out. 
The Labour Party proposes to address the issue of ‘off-rolling’ in school performance tables – though 
their solution is not without challenges – and the Liberal Democrats would broaden the remit of 
                                                          
43 Based on an average inspection cost of £7,200 as estimated by the National Audit Office, uprated for 
inflation.  
44 Jon Andrews and Natalie Perera, ‘Access to high performing secondary schools in England’, (December 2017) 
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inspections to include pupil wellbeing and development. But beyond that, the main parties do little 
to address some of the key challenges in accountability; namely how both the performance tables 
and inspections could be made fairer to all schools. In fact, the Conservative Party included nothing 
on accountability beyond their support for Ofsted. 
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Priority 3: School funding 
While school funding has increased, so have the costs faced by schools, with schools reporting 
increasing financial pressures. As such, school funding has been an important issue, resonating not 
just with schools but parents and the electorate more widely. During the 2017 election campaign, 
the issue of school funding rose from the 5th most important issue to voters, to the 3rd most 
important issue.  
In September 2019, the government announced that it would be increasing the schools’ budget by 
an additional £7.1bn per year by 2022-23. If implemented, this would leave school spending per-
pupil at around the same level in 2022-23 as it was in 2009-10.  
The current landscape 
Long term trends in school spending 
In 2019-20, core funding for schools and high needs totalled just over £40bn, with a further £2.4bn 
delivered via the Pupil Premium and targeted at pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds.45 Figure 
3.1 shows the long-term trend in school spending in England. In 2019-20 overall school spending per 
pupil was about 40 per cent higher in real terms than in 2000-01, this was driven by rapid growth 
during the 2000s when spending per pupil increased by around 5 per cent per year in real terms. 
However, between 2009-10 and 2019-20 per pupil expenditure fell by 8 per cent in real terms. 
The overall level of funding that a school receives has been shown to have an effect on pupil 
attainment.46 The effects are felt more strongly in schools serving disadvantaged communities, those 
with low prior attainment, and with high non-white populations. 
                                                          
45 DfE, ‘National funding formula tables for schools and high needs’ and ‘Pupil premium: allocations and 
conditions of grant 2019 to 2020’, (October 2019)  
46 Stephen Gibbons et al, ‘Does additional spending help urban schools? An evaluation using boundary 
discontinuities’, (November 2017) 
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Figure 3.1: Long term trends in per pupil expenditure in state-funded primary and secondary schools47 
 
Trends in the number of schools in financial difficulty 
These funding pressures have been reflected in the number of schools with end of year deficit 
balances, which has grown in recent years.48 In 2017-18 almost one in three (30.3 per cent) of local 
authority maintained secondary schools were in deficit at an average of nearly half a million pounds. 
Significantly, there was a marked contrast between the proportion of secondary schools and primary 
schools in deficit – only 8.0 per cent of primaries were in deficit in 2017-18. The proportion of special 
schools in deficit nearly doubled between 2014 and 2018 (to 10.1 per cent), with an average deficit 
of nearly a quarter of a million pounds (£225,298). Overall, in 2017-18, around half of all schools had 
expenditure that exceeded their income. 
Distribution of school funding 
As well as the overall quantum of funding creating pressures in some schools, the distribution of that 
funding has also come under scrutiny for being out of date and inconsistent. To address this, the 
government introduced a new national funding formula in April 2018, although the transition 
arrangements mean that it will take a few years for schools to receive their full allocations under this 
new formula.  
In October 2019, the Department for Education published illustrative schools level allocations for the 
National Funding Formula (NFF) for 2020-21.49 Funding allocated through the NFF will total £35.7bn, 
representing an increase in per pupil funding of just over 4 per cent between 2019-20 and 2020-21. 
However, the amount that individual schools will receive is likely to vary considerably. Around one in 
four schools will only see increases in their pupil led funding that are in line with inflation. In London 
this increases to nine in ten schools. 
Around £3.2bn of funding will be allocated through formula factors relating to disadvantage, with an 
additional £2.4bn through the Pupil Premium, targeted towards pupils from low income 
backgrounds. As shown in Figure 3.2, the long-term trend, since the early 2000s, has seen schools 
with higher proportions of pupils eligible for free school meals receiving the largest increases. 
                                                          
47 Jack Britton, Christine Farquharson, and Luke Sibieta, ‘2019 Annual Report on Education Spending in 
England’, (September 2019) 
48 Jon Andrews, ‘School Revenue Balances in England’ (January 2019)  
49 DfE, ‘National funding formula tables for schools and high needs: 2020 to 2021’, (October 2019) 
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Figure 3.2: Core schools block funding and pupil premium allocations per pupil 2002-03 and 2016-17 with 
percentage change in per pupil funding between the two years50  
 
The Conservative government has confirmed its new approach to ‘levelling-up’ funding so that in in 
2020-21 all primary aged pupils receive at least £3,750, and all secondary aged pupils receive at least 
£5,000, in core funding.51 In order to meet this commitment, the NFF includes funding of £266m to 
raise schools to this level if they do not reach it through the other factors alone. Schools that are 
below these minimum levels are disproportionately serving more affluent communities and have 
less challenging intakes, since they generally attract less funding through the NFF. So, while all 
schools will see increases in funding, schools serving less disadvantaged communities are likely to 
see the biggest gains from recent announcements.  
School efficiency 
Despite being a major source of government expenditure, there are no detailed estimates of the 
cost of running a school. The government’s NFF for schools is designed to distribute the total pot of 
money fairly, based on a set of school and pupil characteristics, but that’s quite different from a 
school being funded ‘correctly’. As such, we have a system whereby there’s wide variation in the 
amounts of funding that schools are receiving (even under the NFF) and considerable differences in 
the ways in which they are spending that money.  
Staffing costs represent the largest source of expenditure for schools, with the cost of teachers alone 
accounting for around half of all expenditure.52 The Department for Education has argued that there 
are significant efficiency savings to be made through better staff deployment. As part of a 2016 
study by the National Audit Office (NAO), DfE estimated that a total of £3.0bn of efficiencies could 
                                                          
50 Jon Andrews, ‘Understanding revenue expenditure – Part 2: which types of schools spend the most?’, 
(October 2019) 
51 The per pupil minimum for primary age pupils is planned to increase to £4,000 in 2021-22. 
52 Department for Education, ‘Trends in school expenditure: 2002 to 2016’, (August 2018) 
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be made, comprising £1.3bn through improved procurement and £1.7bn through changes to staff 
deployment.53 The NAO noted that at that stage the department’s guidance on workforce spending 
was not available. 
Funding for high needs 
The adequacy of and system for funding for pupils with special educational needs and disabilities 
(SEND) – funded through the ‘High Needs Block’ – has also become more prominent. A significant 
issue is the ongoing rise in children and young people with SEND, and Education, Health and Care 
Plans (EHCPs).  
The question is not simply the amount of money in the system but how it is distributed. A large 
proportion of funding allocated through the High Needs Funding Formula is based on historical 
spending patterns, meaning that if needs go up or down from year to year, this isn’t fully reflected in 
local budgets and pupils in one local authority could attract significantly more or less funding than a 
pupil in another authority, despite having similar needs. Where local authorities need to deal with 
rising numbers, they have limited flexibility to transfer money from the schools to the high needs 
block. Schools are also required to meet the first £10,000 of costs, which can deter schools from 
taking on pupils with additional needs.  
Children with SEND – and their families – are also often reliant on support from other public 
services, in particular health and social care. Indeed, it was a key aim of the 2014 reforms to drive 
better joint working between education, health and social care. However, health and social care 
services for children with SEND have also faced financial pressure. If children and families are not 
receiving the support they need from other services, it is harder for them to thrive at school; and 
schools will find it more difficult to meet their needs.  
The high needs block also funds pupils in alternative provision (AP), which includes many pupils who 
have been permanently excluded from school. Permanent exclusions have also been increasing. 
Current commissioning arrangements for alternative provision schools also risk placing a pressure on 
local authority budgets. Places in AP free schools are funded centrally from the Education, Skills and 
Funding Agency (ESFA), but then the ESFA deducts the corresponding funding from the high needs 
block of the relevant local authority. But local authorities do not have the power to adjust place 
numbers, meaning that local authorities are facing reductions to their high needs budgets for places 
which they have no control over.  
The government’s one year spending round of September 2019 provided an additional £700m for 
high needs in a one year settlement for 2020-21. If the additional £700m is held flat in real terms it 
will mean that by 2022-23 the overall high needs budget will be some £600m short of what is 
required according to the Education Select Committee.  
What should a new government do?  
Education research suggests that policies should: 
▪ ensure that funding remains progressive and that funding should be targeted where it is needed 
most to help tackle the disadvantage gap; 
                                                          
53 National Audit Office, ‘Financial sustainability of schools’, (December 2016) 
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▪ reform high needs allocations to address inconsistencies between areas in the amounts that 
pupils with similar needs attract; and 
▪ address funding for high needs in mainstream provision, so that funding pressures on schools do 
not have an impact on their ability to provide support for, and ultimately retain, pupils with SEND 
in mainstream provision. 
Manifesto commitments  
All parties have committed to significant additional revenue expenditure on schools to reverse the 
real terms reductions in per pupil funding of the last decade. There are however differences in the 
overall amounts being proposed and the rate at which these increases will be introduced. As well as 
revenue funding we have seen new commitments to improve the condition of the school estate 
through additional capital funding. Three parties have also proposed significant additional 
expenditure on the provision of free school meals. 
Overall level of revenue funding 
The commitments on school revenue funding are within the context of the recent Spending Round 
2019 announcements for funding to 2022-23, in which revenue funding would increase by £7.1bn a 
year in cash terms or around £4.4bn in 2019-20 prices. 
All of the parties have committed to at least this level of expenditure.54 Figure 3.3 shows how total 
revenue expenditure will increase under each of the main parties.  
The Conservative Party has largely kept in line with the commitments set out in Spending Review 
2019. They have however introduced additional expenditure on an arts premium for secondary 
schools (around £100m per year) and additional funding for physical education (around £30m per 
year) meaning that by 2023 total expenditure will be around £4.5bn higher than in 2019-20. After 
accounting for pupil number growth, per pupil funding would be 7.4 per cent higher in real terms. 
The Liberal Democrats go slightly further, with an increase of £4.8bn by 2022-23. After accounting 
for pupil number growth, per pupil funding would be 8.5 per cent higher in real terms. The key 
difference is the rate at which increases occur, with the majority of the increase being seen by 2020-
21 followed by modest increases after that which amount to £0.5bn a year once inflation has been 
accounted for.  
The Labour Party is proposing much larger increases. They would increase funding by £7.5bn by 
2023. After accounting for pupil number growth, per pupil funding would be 14.6 per cent higher in 
real terms. The increases in 2021 would be faster still than those planned by the Liberal Democrats – 
an increase of £5.1bn in the first year – with increases of over £1bn in each of the following two 
years, once inflation has been accounted for.  
The Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties have all also stated that they will provide a 
further £1.5bn a year for increased pension contributions, as set out in Spending Round 2019.  
                                                          
54 The Brexit Party made no statement on school funding. As elsewhere in this report we have assumed that in 
the absence of a different commitment then existing government policy (in this case Spending Round 2019) 
persists. 
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The Green Party commitment is less specific, stating simply that they will be “increasing funding by 
at least £4bn per year”. We have taken this to mean that they will simply increase the schools 
budget by £4bn a year, each year, in cash terms. This would mean that by 2022-23, they would be 
the highest spending party on schools with an increase of £8.9bn above 2019-20 spending. They 
would however be behind Labour’s planned spend in 2021-22 and behind both Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats in 2020-21. The Green Party make no reference to pension contributions and 
whether they would separately meet the £1.5bn of pension contributions as set out in Spending 
Round 2019.  
The Brexit Party made no statement in relation to school funding. We therefore assume that it 
would maintain current government policy, in other words the spending commitments set out in 
Spending Round 2019. 
Figure 3.3: Total school revenue spending (excluding pension funding) 2019-20 to 2022-23 – in 2019-20 
prices  
 
The additional funding announced in the spending round is sufficient to effectively reverse the 
reductions in per pupil spending since 2010.55 However, it is important not to view these spending 
commitments in isolation from other policy commitments, such as teacher pay and expanded free 
school meal provision, which are likely to create additional pressures on school budgets. How money 
is distributed will also affect whether such a reversal is genuinely felt in individual schools.  
                                                          
55 Jack Britton, Christine Farquharson and Luke Sibieta, ‘2019 annual report on education spending in England’, 
(September 2019) 
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Distribution of revenue funding and the Pupil Premium 
The main parties have said relatively little as to whether they will make any changes to how revenue 
funding is distributed. The Conservative Party has maintained their commitment to increase funding 
to at least £5,000 per pupil in secondary schools in 2020-21 and at least £4,000 per pupil in primary 
schools in 2021-22 (£3,750 in 2020-21). The Labour Party have said they will introduce a “a fairer 
funding formula that leaves no child worse off” though provide no further details. 
In October 2019 the Department for Education published notional allocations of school funding for 
2020-21 under the National Funding Formula.56 Overall, per pupil funding increased by just over 4 
per cent in cash terms.  
Figures 3.4 and Figures 3.5 show that there are many schools that are set to receive much less than 
this (the minimum of inflation only) and conversely many that will see increases of twice the 
average. Nationally, 25 per cent of primary schools and 27 per cent of secondary schools are 
expected to receive increases only in line with inflation.  
Schools with high levels of disadvantage are more likely than other schools to see only modest 
increases in per pupil funding next year. Outside of London, around half of secondary schools and 
just over a third of primary schools with high levels of disadvantage (meaning that more than a 
quarter of pupils are eligible for free school meals) will receive only inflation level increases. 
Meanwhile only 13 per cent of secondary schools and 20 per cent of primary schools with low levels 
of disadvantage will receive only the minimal increases to their budgets. 
There are also clear regional differences. In Inner London, nine in ten schools will receive increases 
only in line with inflation. In the South West, fewer than one in ten primary schools will see such a 
small increase. In fact, a third will see increases of over 8 per cent, while no primary schools in Inner 
London will.  
These disparities arise from policy decisions around formula factors in the National Funding Formula, 
including the current Government’s policy of “levelling up” funding. It is important to note, of 
course, that per pupil funding in London will still be much higher in London than elsewhere. 
                                                          
56 Department for Education, ‘National funding formula for schools for schools and high needs: 2020 to 2021’, 
(October 2019) 
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of schools with low increases (inflation only) and large increases (at least 8 per cent) 
in pupil led per pupil funding between 2019-20 and 2020-21 under current government plans by school 
characteristics - primary 
 
Figure 3.5: Percentage of schools with low increases (inflation only) and large increases (at least 8 per cent) 
in pupil led per pupil funding between 2019-20 and 2020-21 under current government plans by school 
characteristics - secondary 
 
Any incoming government that is proposing large scale increases in per pupil funding overall will 
need to carefully consider how that money is distributed. 
The Pupil Premium is an additional grant that is targeted towards disadvantaged pupils. In 2019-20, 
Pupil Premium allocations totalled around £2.4bn and were worth £1,320 per disadvantaged pupil in 
primary school and £935 per disadvantaged pupil in secondary school.57 These allocations are largely 
unchanged from 2014-15 (with an increase in £20 for primary aged pupils and none for secondary 
aged pupils), had they continued in line with inflation, then pupils in primary schools would now 
attract £1,419 and pupils in secondary schools £1,020.  
In other words, the Pupil Premium in primary schools has lost 7 per cent of its value since 2015 and 
the Pupil Premium in secondary schools has lost 8 per cent. If the allocations continue to be held at 
the cash level that they are, then, by the end of the next parliament, the value of the Pupil Premium 
would have fallen by nearly 15 per cent since 2015. Only the Labour Party has committed to 
reversing this fall in the value of the Pupil Premium.58 
                                                          
57 Department for Education, ‘Pupil premium: conditions of grant 2019 to 2020’, (September 2019)  
58 Confirmed in correspondence from the Labour Party on 27 November 2019.  
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Pupil Premium eligibility is likely to increase over the coming years, putting additional pressure on 
the total grant. This is because the Department for Education has put in place eligibility protections 
to ensure that pupils who were previously eligible for a free meal do not lose it as a result of moving 
to Universal Credit. In 2019, the proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals increased by 
nearly 2 percentage points – equivalent to an additional 165,000 pupils.59   
Funding for high needs 
The government’s one-year spending round of September 2019 provided “over £700m more” for 
high needs in a one year settlement for 2020-21. If this is held flat in real terms it will mean that by 
2022-23 the overall high needs budget will be some £600m short of what is required, according to 
estimates made by the Education Select Committee. 
The Conservative Party has not proposed any additional money to that set out in the spending round 
(though their manifesto now provides a more precise £780m). On this basis, we assume that the 
funding will continue at the rate set out in the spending round, meaning that there will still be an 
expected short fall in the high needs budget of over £500m, placing pressure on both school and 
local authority budgets.  
The Labour Party have said they will provide the “necessary funding” for SEND which we interpret as 
meaning the amounts identified by the Education Select Committee. They will also provide £690m to 
address debts incurred by local authorities in recent years. The Liberal Democrats have committed a 
further £730m in 2020-21 to SEND, which would meet the shortfall identified.  
The Green Party do not make any specific commitment on funding for pupils with special 
educational needs and disabilities though they signal an intent to increase the availability of suitable 
places in mainstream education. Similarly, the Conservatives will expand the number of places in 
special schools and alternative provision – which we would assume to be through the free schools 
programme – though no further funding has been identified. 
The Brexit Party make no additional commitments for pupils with special educational needs and 
disabilities. 
We previously noted that it is not simply the amount of high needs funding that has created 
problems for schools and authorities but also how that money is distributed. However, proposals to 
reform how high needs funding is allocated are noticeably limited. The Liberal Democrats would 
halve the amount that schools pay towards the cost of a child’s education, health, and care plan 
which may come some way to reduce financial pressure on schools and encourage inclusion where 
appropriate. The Labour Party mention an ongoing review of high needs funding.  
It would appear that major reform to how high needs funding is allocated is not a priority for any 
party. 
                                                          
59 This does not directly translate into the number eligible for the Pupil Premium as some of the ‘new’ pupils 
may have been eligible for free school meals in the past anyway.  
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Spending impacts from other announcements 
Free school meals 
Currently all children in England’s state funded schools in reception, year 1 and year 2 are entitled to 
a free school meal (FSM) through Universal Infant Free School Meals (UIFSM). Disadvantaged 
primary and secondary pupils are also eligible for FSM if they, or their parents, receive qualifying 
benefits, such as Universal Credit (UC).60 Those in receipt of UC must have an equivalent annual net 
earned income of no more than £7,400 (before benefits) in order to be eligible.  
The Conservatives have made no reference to UIFSM in their manifesto, so we assume there are no 
changes – neither an end of the policy, nor an expansion. 
The Labour Party proposes extending free school meals for all primary pupils. Based on pupil 
numbers from the January 2019 school census this would suggest that an additional 2.2 million 
primary pupils become eligible for FSM, though not all of these pupils would take a meal. The Labour 
Party estimates this would cost £900m based on the 2019-20 rate of £440 - £2.30 a day for 190 days.  
The Liberal Democrats’ policy is to extend free school meals to all children in primary education and 
to all secondary school children whose families receive Universal Credit (as well as promoting school 
breakfast clubs). Based on 2019 FSM pupil numbers and assumptions about who becomes eligible 
under Universal Credit.61 We estimate that this would mean an additional 3.2 million pupils become 
eligible for FSM – comprising 2.2 million more primary pupils and 1 million more secondary pupils. 
Again, not all of these pupils would take a meal. The Liberal Democrats estimate that this would cost 
£1,160m, again this is based on a rate of £2.30 per meal. 
There is a risk that both have underestimated the true cost to schools of such an expansion. The rate 
of £2.30 is based on a survey carried out in 2012 which estimated the cost of primary school meals 
consisting of £1.20 in labour, £0.67 on ingredients, and £0.43 in overheads.62 Those estimates have 
not been updated in that time. During the early years of the UIFSM programme, schools were 
protected to some extent by falling food costs and weak wage growth.63 However, significant 
increases in the national minimum wage, including the introduction of the National Living Wage, and 
further increases announced by all parties, are likely to create further pressure on this unit rate as 
catering staff are likely to be at or close to these rates. 
By way of illustration, the minimum wage in 2011-12 when the survey was carried out was £6.08. In 
the current financial year the National Living Wage (for those aged 25 and above) is £8.21 – an 
increase of 35 per cent. Whilst we are unable to measure the wage rates of catering staff from data 
                                                          
60 To protect pupils from uncertainty during the introduction of UC, there are transitional protections that 
mean that pupils who were eligible for FSM on 1 April 2018, and those who become eligible during the UC 
rollout period until 2022, will retain eligibility until the end of this rollout period. Following this, if they are still 
in education, they will continue to be eligible until the end of their phase of education 
61Around half of pupils would be in families in receipt of Universal Credit; Department for Education ‘Eligibility 
for free school meals, the early years pupil premium and the free early education entitlement for two-year-olds 
under Universal Credit: Government consultation response’, (March 2018).  
62 Michael Nelson et al, ‘Seventh annual survey of take up of school lunches in England: 2011/12’, (July 2012) 
63 Peter Sellen et al, ‘Evaluation of Universal Infant Free School Meals’, (January 2018) 
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available to us, a comparison of school expenditure on catering staff in 2013 and 2019 suggests that 
spending increased by 30 per cent in that period.64  
If there was a genuine increase in staffing costs over this period of this magnitude it would suggest 
that costs have risen from £2.30 to £2.66. This alone would create a further £140m pressure on 
Labour’s proposal and £180m on that of the Liberal Democrats. The Labour party has committed to 
an increase in the living wage to £10 – an increase of 64 per cent since 2012 – and the Liberal 
Democrats have committed to reviewing the rate of the National Living Wage. If the National Living 
Wage were to be increased to £10, then the cost pressures of expanding the UIFSM programme 
would increase to something of the order of £300m for Labour’s proposal and £390m for the Liberal 
Democrats. There may also be additional capital expenditure associated with expanding provision. 
It is important to note that, even without expansion of the programme, if the cost of providing 
UIFSM and FSM more generally is closer to £2.66 than £2.30, then the programme will be 
underfunded under any future government.  
Teacher pay 
We estimate that in 2019-20, expenditure by schools on teacher salaries will total around £24bn.65 
This means that each increase of 1 per cent in teacher salaries creates a pressure in the region of 
£240m on school budgets.  
The Conservative Party has pledged to raise teacher starting salaries to a minimum of £30,000 by 
2022-23. This represents an increase of 23 per cent on minimum salaries, which in 2019-20 were 
£24,373 outside of London. Around one fifth of teachers are currently below the £30,000 threshold. 
We estimate that uplifting teachers to this point creates a pressure of around 1 per cent on the wage 
bill. Whilst we view it as likely that there will be associated increases for teachers who are above this 
threshold already, there are currently no further details as to how this will be implemented. 
Therefore, we assume that on average, teacher salaries would continue to increase by 2.75 per cent, 
consistent with the STRB recommendation for 2019-20. If this was consistent across all teachers, this 
would mean expenditure on teachers increasing by around £2bn by 2022-23. This expenditure would 
offset some of the expenditure required to lift teachers to £30,000, so the amounts are not simply 
additive. 
As well as increasing teacher starting salaries in line with the Conservative proposal, the Liberal 
Democrats are proposing increases in teacher pay of at least 3 per cent a year over the course of the 
Parliament. This would imply that by 2022-23, school expenditure on teachers would have increased 
by around £2.2bn in cash terms. Again, this would offset some of the expenditure required to lift 
teachers to the £30,000. 
Finally, the Labour party has pledged the largest increase in pay as part of their broader commitment 
to increase pay for all public sector workers beginning with an increase of 5 per cent. This would be 
an increase of around £1.2bn in 2020-21, increasing to £3.8bn by 2022-23 if the increases were to be 
of the same scale each year. However, the Labour Party has included a separate budget (reaching 
                                                          
64 Analysis of a sample of local authority maintained schools with expenditure in 2013 and 2019. Analysis 
restricted to junior schools, secondary schools, and special schools – i.e. to exclude infant schools and all 
through primary – so as to avoid distortion from UIFSM roll out. 
65 Based on total spend of £22.3bn in 2016-17 uplifted by 1 per cent in 2017-18, 2.9 per cent in 2018-19, and 
2.75 per cent in 2019-20. 
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£5.3bn in 2023/24) within their costings to cover increases in public sector pay, with additional 
payments to the Department for Education outside of the core schools budget. 
Neither the Green Party nor the Brexit Party make any commitments on teacher pay, therefore we 
assume that they will continue increases in line with STRB 2019 – 2.75 per cent a year, or around 
£2bn by 2022-23. 
Reduced class sizes 
The Liberal Democrats include a commitment to reduce class sizes, though they do not specify the 
age range that would be included or the scale of any reduction. The Labour Party has committed to 
reducing class sizes in primary schools to under 30 – though there is no commitment to any further 
legislation nor is it clear whether the existing exceptions would apply and if they did, whether they 
would be extended to all primary aged pupils. 
In 2019, 10.9 per cent of primary school classes in England had more than 30 pupils – 2,378 classes 
at Key Stage 1 and 12,423 classes at Key Stage 2 exceeded this threshold. A very simplistic approach 
is to assume that the ambition would be met if places were created for all those pupils in excess of 
this threshold – in total, an additional 26,000 places. This would come at a cost of around £300m in 
capital expenditure for the creation of new school places, and ongoing teacher costs of around £40m 
per year.66 However, this is an incredibly conservative estimate as it assumes that all pupils in 
‘oversized’ classes can be redistributed with perfect efficiency.  
The Green Party has the most ambitious target of reducing class sizes to under 20, though this is 
framed as a long term ambition, and therefore it is unlikely that they would seek to deliver over the 
course of one parliament. 
Overall assessment 
All of the parties have committed to significant additional spending on schools relative to 2019-20, 
though significant cost pressures have also been identified and there has been little discussion of 
addressing concerns with the allocation of high needs funding. The schools pupil premium is set to 
experience further real terms cuts under the plans of all parties, except for the Labour Party. 
The Conservative Party have largely maintained the funding increases identified in Spending Round 
2019, with some additional money allocated for the arts and physical education. Some schools will 
only see inflation level increases in the short term, this is particularly the case for schools with high 
levels of disadvantage. Schools will also face increasing cost pressures from the rises in teacher 
salaries which have to be met through core funding. The manifesto does not set out any additional 
spending for high needs, nor any indication of any reforms to its distribution. 
Overall, the Liberal Democrats have allocated slightly more than current government plans, and their 
increases would reach schools more quickly. This includes additional money for the expansion of 
universal infant free school meals to all primary aged pupils and secondary aged pupils in families in 
receipt of universal credit. The cost of providing these meals is likely to have been underestimated 
                                                          
66 Broad estimate based on the average salary of a primary school teacher of £34,700 (derived from DfE 
‘School workforce in England: November 2018’, June 2019), uprated by 2.75 per cent to reflect increases in 
2019-20, on-costs of 26 per cent, and capital cost of a place of £10,900 from NAO ‘Capital funding for schools’ 
uprated to 2019-20 prices. 
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given recent increases in the National Minimum and Living Wages. The Liberal Democrats would 
however provide additional money for pupils with special educational needs and disabilities at a 
level that would address identified shortfalls, and would also encourage inclusion by ensuring costs 
to schools are reduced. 
The Labour Party would spend more on schools than either of the other main parties and would also 
increase spending rapidly in the new parliament. They too would expand the provision of free meals 
to all primary aged pupils, the costs of which are likely to have been underestimated. They would 
address the shortfall in the total amount of high needs funding, but the manifesto lacks significant 
commitments to addressing the challenges associated with how the money is distributed. 
The Green Party’s spending commitments would appear to be the most ambitious, however there is 
little detail about the profile of spend over the course of the parliament. Their long term targets to 
reduce class sizes to under 20 would incur significant additional revenue and capital expenditure 
which was not explored at all in the manifesto. 
The Brexit Party did not address any issues related to school funding. 
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Priority 4: Teacher recruitment and retention 
Teacher quality is widely accepted to be one of the most important factors in determining pupil 
attainment, particularly for disadvantaged pupils. An adequate supply of effective teachers is central 
to ensuring high educational standards, but England is currently experiencing teacher shortages that 
are likely to worsen in the coming years if left unaddressed.  
Challenges to the supply of quality teachers are particularly acute in secondary schools, which is 
where the disadvantage gap is widest. 
The current landscape 
Teacher recruitment and retention 
In recent years, teacher numbers in both primary and secondary schools have failed to rise in line 
with increasing pupil numbers. 67 There are particular recruitment challenges in specific subjects and 
in more disadvantaged schools. Physics and mathematics are subjects with particularly low levels of 
teachers with a relevant degree, indicating a potentially smaller pool of possible recruits.  
The quality and stability of the workforce in disadvantaged schools has been a long-running issue. 
Teachers in these schools tend to be younger, less experienced and with shorter tenures.68 Emerging 
evidence finds that higher teacher turnover has a small but detrimental impact on average student 
attainment.69  
While most acute in disadvantaged schools, the problem of recruitment and retention within the 
secondary teacher workforce is felt across a range of settings. Teacher recruitment targets have 
been persistently missed and dropout rates are on the rise (Figure 4.1). In special schools, teacher 
exit rates have risen from 9.1 per cent in 2011 to 11.3 per cent in 2018. Teacher exit rates in primary 
schools have also been creeping up in recent years, however the issue is not so acute as in secondary 
schools. 
                                                          
67 Luke Sibieta, ‘The Teacher Labour Market in England: Shortages, Subject Expertise and Incentives’, (August 
2018) 
68 Rebecca Allen, Simon Burgess, and Jennifer Mayo, ‘The Teacher Labour Market, Teacher Turnover and 
Disadvantaged Schools: New Evidence for England’, (January 2018)  
69 Stephen Gibbons, Vincenzo Scrutino, and Shqiponja Telhaj, ‘Teacher Turnover: Does It Matter for Pupil 
Achievement?’, (February 2018) 
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of teachers leaving state-funded schools by year in which they qualified and years 
since qualification70 
 
Teacher workload and working conditions 
Workload is often cited by teachers as a serious concern in surveys, and teachers in England work 
longer hours compared to other high performing OECD countries, though recent research has 
argued that this is not new.71 
Nevertheless, more detailed analysis tells us that the issue is not as straightforward as the total 
number of hours worked. Primary teachers work more hours than secondary teachers, and yet 
retention rates for primary teachers are better than they are for secondary teachers.72 Analysis of 
international data collected through the 2013 Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) 
suggested that other important factors are how supported teachers feel and their overall job 
satisfaction.73  
Overall, it would appear that reducing hours worked may only be part of the solution, alongside 
improving school leadership, working conditions and training opportunities. 
Teacher pay 
Teacher pay also appears to be an important factor in the teacher workforce challenge, especially for 
retaining teachers in certain subject areas. Data published by Department for Education in 
September 2018 finds that teachers in maths and physics have some of the lowest retention rates.74 
Figure 4.2 shows that graduates with degrees in science, technology, engineering or maths 
disciplines (STEM subjects) tend to earn more outside of teaching, whilst teachers with non-STEM 
                                                          
70 DfE, ‘School workforce in England: November 2018’, (June 2019) 
71 Rebecca Allen et al., ‘New Evidence on Teachers’ Working Hours in England. An Empirical Analysis of Four 
Datasets’, (September 2019) 
72 Matt Walker, Jack Worth and Jens Van den Brande, ‘Teacher workload survey 2019: Research report’, 
(October 2019) 
73 Sam Sims, ‘Modelling the Relationships between Teacher Working Conditions, Job Satisfaction and 
Workplace Mobility’, (Forthcoming) 
74 Department for Education, ‘Analysis of Teacher Supply, Retention and Mobility’, (September 2018) 
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degrees tend to earn more as teachers. These teachers with a smaller ‘outside pay gap’ tend to have 
higher retention rates than those with STEM-degrees.  
The government’s one-year spending round, published in September 2019, announced a significant 
increase in the starting salaries for teachers to £30,000 by 2022/23, an increase of 25 per cent in 
three years.75  
Figure 4.2: Retention and earnings outside teaching, by degree subject  
 
In the immediate future, challenges in the quality and supply of teachers could become more acute 
than those faced by recent governments. This is because of a population bulge that is set to cause an 
increase in the number of secondary pupils by nearly 10 per cent from 2019 to 2023. If current 
trends in recruitment, retention and unequal distribution are left unaddressed by future 
governments, schools will be faced with difficult decisions about the breadth of their curriculum, 
class sizes, and their ability to provide for pupils with additional needs.  
One important innovation in the government’s recent recruitment and retention strategy is the 
reform of training bursaries, targeting phased pay incentives at teachers in the subjects and 
disadvantaged areas where retention challenges are most pressing. This aligns with previous 
recommendations that salary bonuses in shortage subjects should be introduced with some 
urgency.67 There are still concerns around the proposed timing of these bursary reforms, as by the 
time they are introduced the teacher gap will be substantially larger.  
What should a new government do?  
Education research suggests that priorities should: 
▪ include the pay and quality of early career teachers 
                                                          
75 Department for Education, ‘£30,000 Starting Salaries Proposed for Teachers’, (September 2019) 
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▪ encourage the recruitment of teachers into shortage subjects and into schools in more 
disadvantaged areas 
The overarching approach amongst most of the parties is a focus on tackling the recruitment and 
retention crisis. Approaches are mainly centred around raising teacher pay and reducing workload. 
Teacher pay is approached both through raising starting salaries and through the size of annual 
increases for the existing school workforce. Strategies for alleviating workload follow a general 
common thread for the Labour, Liberal Democrat and Green parties of scrapping formal assessments 
in primary schools, reducing class sizes, and reforming school accountability. In one instance, there is 
also a focus on teacher entitlement to formalised continuous professional development. 
The main issue left unaddressed in manifestos is how parties plan to aid recruitment and retention 
of teachers in certain shortage subjects or more disadvantaged parts of the country. 
Manifesto commitments 
Increasing teacher pay 
The Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties have all committed to increasing teacher 
pay. The intention of all these policies is broadly that the pay rises would act as a retention 
mechanism for existing teachers. Schools would ultimately continue to determine how staff are paid, 
but upper and lower boundaries of pay ranges would be adjusted accordingly. Academy status 
allows individual schools to set their own pay structures, and around a fifth of multi-academy trusts 
report that most or all of their schools do this.76 The Labour Party have said they will introduce a 
‘common rulebook’ for all schools and a return to national pay settlements, so this flexibility will be 
lost. 
The Conservative manifesto makes no mention of raising teacher salaries in future, beyond the 2.75 
per cent uplift committed to for the current 2019/20 academic year as in line with the 
recommendation of the School Teachers’ Review Board (STRB).77 It is not clear whether the 
Conservative Party is committed to continuing to raise teacher pay by similar levels each year. 
The Liberal Democrats have pledged an increase of “at least three per cent per year throughout the 
parliament”.  
Finally, the Labour Party has pledged the largest increase as part of their broader commitment to 
increase pay for all public sector workers. The manifesto states the intention to “restore public 
sector pay to at least pre-financial crisis levels (in real terms), by delivering year-on-year above-
inflation pay rises, starting with a 5 per cent increase”. 
The Conservative Party has pledged to raise teacher starting salaries to a minimum of £30,000, as 
have the Liberal Democrats, in addition to the 3 per cent salary increase for existing teachers 
committed to above. The intention is to make teacher salaries more competitive in the graduate 
labour market, with a view to attracting additional and potentially more highly qualified individuals 
                                                          
76 Rob Cirin, ‘Academy trust survey 2017: Research report’, (July 2017)  
77 Department for Education, ‘School teachers’ pay to rise by 2.75%’, (July 2019)  
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into becoming early career teachers. The current government has said that it would deliver this rise 
by 2022/23 and the Liberal Democrats have matched that commitment.78 
Our analysis of school funding provides broad estimates of the cost of these pay rises. An increase of 
2.75 per cent per year, as proposed by the Conservative Party, would increase expenditure on 
teachers by around £2bn by 2022-23. The increases of 5 per cent proposed by the Labour Party 
would cost £1.2bn in the first year and £3.8bn in 2022-23 if there were similar increases each year. 
The Labour Party say that this would be provided outside of the core schools budget, but it is not 
clear what additional budget would be allocated to the Department for Education or how this would 
be distributed among schools.79 In the absence of any other funding commitment we assume that 
the Liberal Democrat policy of an annual three per cent pay rise would come out of the proposed 
schools budget. 
The Liberal Democrat Party pledge to increase teacher numbers by 20,000 – through a combination 
of increased recruitment and improved retention. This increase cannot be guaranteed, effectively 
because spending and teacher recruitment are within the control of schools. The pledge can be 
more accurately stated as an intention to fund schools, via core school funding, to enable them to 
recruit this number of additional teachers, and it must be intended that offers on teacher pay and 
CPD entitlements (discussed below) will improve numbers through recruitment and retention. 
Any pay increases for teachers will need to be properly funded without creating new pressures on 
school budgets, as underlined by the preceding analysis of school funding. 
Targeted policies to address subject shortages and disadvantage 
There is a need to address the uneven distribution of teachers in shortage subjects, particularly 
those teaching in the least affluent areas, and evidence suggests that targeted bursaries and pay 
supplements can be effective in addressing this. The government announced such a scheme in 
January 2019 in its Recruitment and Retention Strategy which included plans to reform teacher 
bursaries to target specific shortage subjects and to weight retention payments in favour of teachers 
working in more challenging areas.80 Another feature of this strategy is the Early Careers Framework 
which is intended to strengthen an early career teachers’ entitlement to support and training time. 
This Recruitment and Retention Strategy, including the policies of targeted pay and the Early Careers 
Framework, is not mentioned in any manifesto. We assume that, with no statement to the contrary, 
the strategy will be carried over as government policy. It is striking that, given the urgency of teacher 
recruitment and retention, no party has explicitly pledged to take these policies forward. 
One party pledge that does aim to tackle the shortage of teachers with relevant qualifications in the 
subjects they teach is contained in the Liberal Democrat manifesto. It pledges to introduce a “clear 
and properly funded entitlement” for “genuinely high-quality professional development for all 
teachers – rising to the level of 50 hours per year by 2025.” The pledge also includes extra training 
for teachers who are required to teach subjects at secondary level where they themselves do not 
                                                          
78 Department for Education, ‘£30,000 Starting Salaries Proposed for Teachers’, (September 2019) 
79 Labour Party, ‘Funding real change’, (November 2019) 
80 Department for Education ‘Teacher recruitment and retention strategy’, (January 2019) 
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have a post A-level qualification. This is with the intention to “ensure teachers are empowered to 
focus on delivering a high-quality education to their pupils”.  
The Teaching and Learning International Survey 2018 estimated that full-time primary school 
teachers spend 1.4 hours on average a week on professional development, with secondary full-time 
teachers averaging 1.1 hours (for part-time teachers this was 0.8 hours and 0.7 hours a week 
respectively). 81 Assuming 39 weeks in a school year, and that teachers do not engage in CPD outside 
of the school year, this would imply primary teachers are spending 55 hours a year, and secondary 
teachers are spending 43 hours a year, on CPD. Based on these estimates (which are likely to vary 
with other surveys), primary teachers are already accessing the pledged entitlement with secondary 
teachers some way behind.  
However, it is difficult to obtain consistent and reliable estimates of how many hours teachers are 
currently spending on professional development each week. Even within the same survey, teachers 
can report different numbers of total working hours depending on how that information is derived.82 
Therefore, estimates of average hours spent on development activity such as these should be 
treated with some caution.  
A key issue is the quality of the CPD currently being accessed. The Department for Education has set 
out standards for teachers’ professional development.83 It is uncertain how far these standards are 
met across schools’ current CPD offer. Indeed, while the evidence base for what constitutes high-
quality professional development for teachers has strengthened in recent years, there is still some 
way to go in understanding exactly how training can best support teachers to improve pupil 
attainment in different settings or to stay in the teaching profession, and how this can be delivered 
at different scales.84  
Statistics from the Department for Education suggest that schools are currently spending around 
£300m a year on staff development and training.85 It can be assumed that this expenditure would 
need to be higher in order to achieve the quality of CPD pledged by the Liberal Democrats at this 
scale. If implemented, it would be important for an incoming government to focus on quality and 
cost-effectiveness of the training available, as a priority over the number of hours a teacher is 
entitled to. 
Teacher workload 
The Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, and the Green Party all propose to reduce teacher 
workload by abolishing statutory tests in primary schools and by reforming school accountability. 
                                                          
81John Jerrim and Sam Sims, ‘The Teaching and Learning International Survey 2018: Research report’, (June 
2019) 
82 Rebecca Allen et al, ‘New evidence on teachers’ working hours in England. An empirical analysis of four 
datasets’, (September 2019) 
83 Department for Education, ‘Standard for teachers’ professional development’, (July 2016) 
84 Helen Timperley et al, 'Teacher Professional Learning and Development: Best Evidence Synthesis Iteration 
(BES)', (2007); Philippa Cordingley et al, ‘Understanding What Enables High Quality Professional Learning’, 
(August 2012) 
85 Department for Education, ‘Trends in school spending: 2002-2016’, (August 2018); Per pupil spend multiplied 
by number of pupils in January 2019 and in 2019-20 prices. 
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Whilst these reforms have broader aims in shaping the school system, one of their aims is in essence 
to ‘let teachers focus on teaching’ through cutting other demands on their time. 
In a similar vein, there are also pledges to reduce class sizes. The Green Party has pledged to focus 
funding to reduce class sizes down to under 20 in the long term, with the intention of helping 
“teachers focus on individual pupil needs”. The Labour Party has pledged that primary school classes 
should be a maximum of 30 pupils. 
Labour has also pledged to fund more non-contact time for teachers to prepare and plan. 
Neither the Conservative Party nor the Brexit Party refer to policies in this area. 
Many of these reforms to tackle workload are targeted at primary schools when the recruitment and 
retention issue is most acute and urgent in secondary schools. Moreover, it is not a given that 
tackling teacher workload, at least in terms of the number of hours worked, would have bearing on 
improving teacher retention. This is because the evidence is mixed on whether hours worked is at 
the root of the workforce issues in secondary schools. However, it is not clear that the purpose of 
these pledges is directly to reduce the number of hours worked, but rather to allow teachers to 
focus their time on activity they feel is more meaningful in terms of encouraging progress in their 
pupils – though again, this would be the case in primary rather than secondary schools.  
On class sizes, we have considered implications for funding, as discussed under Priority 3, but it is 
also worth considering the evidence on how this would impact on teacher recruitment needs and 
retention if the proposal to limit primary school classes to 30 pupils were to be achieved.  
Assuming that enough teachers can be supplied to meet demand of maximum class sizes of 30 
across primary schools, reducing class sizes in this way may potentially contribute to enabling 
teachers to dedicate time to activities they feel are meaningful for encouraging pupil progress. 
However, the evidence on the impact on pupil attainment of reduced class sizes suggests that class 
sizes would need to be substantially smaller than 30 in order to have a notable impact on pupil 
attainment.86 While the evidence is thin here, this might indicate that a reduction of class sizes to 30 
maximum may not in fact be enough to have an impact on how teachers feel about their work. Once 
again, this should be caveated with the point that it is not in primary schools that most attention 
needs to be focused when it comes to reducing workload or alleviating retention issues. 
Overall assessment 
The Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties have all pledged to increase teacher pay, 
with Labour’s commitment being the most generous. The Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties 
have additionally committed to improving pay for early career teachers. However, there is no explicit 
mention of targeted pay incentives where retention and recruitment issues are most challenging. 
The only party with a pledged focus on improving the quality of teachers is the Liberal Democrat 
Party. Their commitment to introduce a formalised CPD entitlement, particularly the offer targeted 
at teachers without qualifications beyond A level in their taught subject, is the only explicit mention 
of targeting recruitment challenges in specific subject areas. 
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The measures proposed by Labour, the Liberal Democrat and Green parties to change the focus of 
teachers’ work through reforming accountability and assessment are all focused within primary 
schools and therefore are not targeted at where the recruitment and retention issues are most 
acute.  
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Priority 5: Access to good schools 
While the school attended explains a relatively small proportion of the variation in pupil outcomes it 
still matters. The difference in outcomes between the highest and lowest performing schools on the 
government’s key measure of performance is equivalent to around two grades in each GCSE subject.  
It is not simply about attainment. For example, the school a child attends might affect whether they 
have appropriate support for special educational needs, and whether they are more likely to be 
excluded or experience an unexplained exit.  
But access to high performing schools is still not equitable, and pupils from disadvantaged 
backgrounds are less likely to attend good schools than are their peers. School admissions criteria, 
the location of high performing schools, parental preferences, and family resources available to 
navigate the admissions system (financial, social and educational), all appear to play a role in 
determining this outcome. 
The current landscape 
Geographical variation 
Access to high performing secondary schools became more geographically unequal over the period 
2010-2015, in spite of government policies aimed at improving school performance outside higher 
performing areas such as London.87 Access to high performing secondary schools is better in areas 
such as London and in parts of the South, but is poor in areas such as the North East, Yorkshire and 
the Humber, and parts of the Midlands. 
Academies and free schools 
Over the past decade, improving access to good schools has tended to focus on structural reform – 
largely through the academies and free schools programme. By November 2019, 35 per cent of 
state-funded primary schools, 77 per cent of state-funded secondary schools, and 38 per cent of 
state-funded special schools, were academies or free schools.88 The majority were in multi-academy 
trusts, around half of which have three or fewer academies in them. In total, 52 per cent of pupils in 
state-funded schools in England are being educated in an academy or free school.  
From a perspective of school standards there is little evidence that a move to a fully academised 
system, or a reversal of the programme and an end of academies, would have a positive impact on 
pupil outcomes. 
The early sponsored academies (opened under the Labour government) demonstrated 
improvements equivalent to one grade in each of five GCSE subjects.89 However, the impact of later 
sponsored academies was less conclusive with small improvements prior to opening (equivalent to 
one grade in one subject) continuing in the year after opening and then tailing off. Increases of one 
                                                          
87 Jon Andrews and Natalie Perera, ‘Access to High Performing Schools in England’, (December 2017) 
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schools and University Technical Colleges. 
89 Jon Andrews and Natalie Perera, ‘The Impact of Academies on Educational Outcomes’, (July 2017) 
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grade in one subject were also seen in schools rated as ‘outstanding’ that became converter 
academies but there was no such increase seen in schools previously rated as ‘good’ or ‘satisfactory’.  
The differences between the highest and lowest performing multi-academy trusts and local 
authorities are far more significant – equivalent to around half a grade in each subject at GCSE – 
than the differences between academies and local authority schools as a whole.90  
On average, free schools are currently the highest performing school group at GCSE. But there is 
important context to that performance. Secondary free schools are disproportionately drawing from 
neighbourhood types – in terms of demographics, employment, housing, household composition, 
and economic factors – from which pupils, on average, perform well. Pupils in free schools identified 
as top-performing are almost twice as likely as other pupils to live in these highest performing 
neighbourhood types.91 
Taken as a whole, neither a move to a fully academised system, nor a return to a system of local 
authority oversight (for the vast majority of schools), is likely to lead to an increase in school 
standards by itself.  
Creating new school places 
The population bulge which began early in the new millennium has also created an ongoing pressure 
to create additional school places. Whilst the effects of this bulge have now been fully felt in primary 
schools – in fact, the primary aged population is projected to fall slightly over the next decade – the 
secondary aged population is set to increase. In 2018, the number of pupils in state-funded 
secondary schools was 2.85m, and is expected to reach 3.27m by 2027, an increase of 14.7 per cent 
or over 400,000 additional pupils.92 
Free schools are the now the primary route by which new schools are created, though the majority 
of new places occurs in existing schools. Primary free school places continue to be created where 
there is a need for more school places, but this is less the case for secondary free schools. Both 
primary and secondary free schools are also being set up in areas where there is already an excess in 
school capacity. The creation of places has not necessarily been directed towards areas in need of 
more high-quality schools.93  
Class sizes 
Infant (Foundation Stage and Key Stage 1) class sizes have a statutory limit of 30 pupils, though there 
are a number of exceptions that allow this limit to be exceeded such as in the case of twins, children 
who were previously looked after by the local authority, and children of armed forces personnel who 
were admitted outside of the normal admissions round.94 There are no statutory limits for older 
primary aged pupils (Key Stage 2, typically aged 7 to 11) or pupils of secondary school age.  
Figure 5.1 shows the trends in primary school class sizes between 2006 and 2019. While primary 
school class sizes have now stabilised (27.1 in January 2019), they continue to increase in secondary 
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92 Department for Education, ‘National pupil projections: July 2018 (2019 update)’, (July 2019) 
93 Bobbie Mills, Emily Hunt and Jon Andrews, ‘Free schools in England: 2019 report’, (October 2019) 
94 The School Admissions (Infant Class Sizes) (England) Regulations 2012 
54 
 
schools – 21.7, up from 20.1 in 2015.95 The percentage of infant classes that exceed 30 pupils has 
been falling since 2015, from 5.4 per cent to 3.9 per cent, but this is still double the percentage in 
2010. England’s class sizes are also high by international standards. The average primary school class 
across the OECD is 21 pupils.96  
Figure 5.1: Percentage of primary school classes by size of class and average class size, 2006 to 201997  
 
Grammar schools 
Any expansion in the number of grammar school places – either through the opening of new 
selective schools, or the expansion of existing schools – is likely to have negative effects on the 
attainment of disadvantaged pupils.98 
Pupils who are eligible for free school meals (FSM), a proxy for disadvantage, are under-represented 
in grammar schools. Only 2.5 per cent of grammar school pupils are entitled to FSM, compared with 
an average of 13.2 per cent in all state funded secondary schools. A main cause of this significant 
under-representation of disadvantaged pupils in grammar schools is that, by the time the ‘11 Plus’ 
entry exam (or equivalent) is taken, pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds are 9 months of 
learning behind their peers.  
Attainment in selective areas is characterised as providing small gains for those that attend grammar 
schools, and attainment penalties for those that do not. Our modelling suggests that further 
expansion in selective school places would result in smaller gains for grammar school pupils and 
larger losses for those not attending selective schools – losses which will be greatest amongst poor 
children. 
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Special schools  
Whilst access to high quality mainstream schools remains inequitable, access to specialist provision 
can be more challenging still. Pupils with SEND have to travel further to reach any special school.99 In 
cities, the average pupil at an urban special school travels around 4 miles each way. In rural 
areas the average travel distance is 10 miles each way. In the most rural areas in England, the figure 
is even more striking – with around one in ten special school pupils having to travel over 23 miles 
one way just to get to school. Overall, pupils in special schools are, on average, travelling around 
three times as far as pupils in mainstream schools. 
School admissions 
The likelihood of families getting their first choice of secondary school has been falling in recent 
years. Around 1 in 20 pupils were offered a school in 2019 that they did not even apply to. This 
reflects rising demand for secondary places.100  
White British families are more likely than Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) families to get 
offered their first choice of secondary school, and these ethnic gaps are only partly explained by 
where people live (with higher competition for places in more ethnically diverse, urban areas).101 
Pupils with English as their first (as opposed to an additional) language are also much more likely to 
get offered their first choice, as are (to a lesser extent) better off pupils relative to their peers 
eligible for the Pupil Premium. 
What should a new government do? 
▪ Do not rely on large scale structural reform for the purposes of raising standards. If the 
objective is to raise attainment, there is no strong evidence for a move to a fully academised 
system, nor is there such evidence for a return to a largely local authority based system. Analysis 
shows that there are strong and weak performers in both school types.  
▪ Do not expand the number of grammar schools or grammar school places. The evidence is clear 
that a concentration of selective school places is associated with attainment losses for those that 
do not attend and these are disproportionately pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds. The 
penalties increase as the number of selective school places increases. 
▪ Conduct a review of the school admissions system. The current system, through both 
applications and through appeals and waiting lists, is perpetuating inequalities in access to good 
schools, and increasing social segregation. Such a review should consider catchment areas and 
banding. 
▪ Consider all pupils when planning access to good school places. Over 100,000 pupils attend 
England’s special schools and they are frequently struggling to access specialist provision with 
excessive journeys to and from school. 
Manifesto commitments  
As in the 2017 General Election, structural reforms feature in manifesto commitments with 
approaches ranging from the continued expansion of the academies and free schools programme to 
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its complete reversal. Private schools also come under the spotlight with plans to remove their 
charitable status and charge VAT on fees, and a signalling of longer-term aspirations to integrate 
private schools into the state system. There are also calls to improve access and quality of provision 
for those with special educational needs and disabilities. While parental choice remains an 
important feature of the school system in England, no parties are suggesting any reforms to the 
admissions system. 
Academies and free schools 
The Green Party are proposing the most significant reform with an end to the academies and free 
schools programme and a complete return to local authority oversight. As set out above, this is 
unlikely to lead to an overall increase in standards. An end of the academies programme would also 
mean that there are likely to be cases where schools are moved from high performing academy 
trusts, to low performing local authorities.  
The Labour Party would move control over school budgets away from academy trusts so that they 
are managed by individual schools and schools would be overseen by a governing body with elected 
representatives. Local authorities would also be able to establish new schools themselves – a change 
from the current policy where it is assumed that all new schools are free schools managed by an 
academy trust. The manifesto appears to stop short of returning academies to being maintained by a 
local authority, but a much greater degree of local authority oversight seems to be envisaged and a 
greater consistency of curriculum policy between and academies and local authority maintained 
schools.  
Similarly, the Liberal Democrats propose a move in which the local authority would have a strategic 
oversight role over schools but the model of both academies and local authority maintained schools 
would remain. 
The intention of both the Labour, and to a much lesser extent the Liberal Democrats, would appear 
to be to weaken the role of multi-academy trusts by removing their direct control over schools and 
moving to a model closer to that of a ‘weak’ federation of schools or even a local authority 
maintained community school. Their aim would be to make schools more accountable to their local 
communities, rather than large trusts. Within this context it is important to recognise that the vast 
majority of academy trusts are actually small – around 85 per cent have five or fewer schools and 
these account for around 45 per cent of all academies.  
Reforms of this kind could also limit the capacity of multi-academy trusts to achieve economies of 
scale across their schools and manage resources effectively. Data from 2016-17 show that the 
propensity to have an in-year deficit – i.e. for a school to be spending more than its income - was 
lower in academies in multi-academy trusts than for local authority schools.102 This could be because 
of the ability of academy trusts to move part of their budgets between schools. There is also 
emerging evidence that multi-academy trusts are playing an increasing role in the development of 
new teachers with a higher proportion of new entrants, and faster progression to middle-leadership 
roles than in other state-funded schools.103 
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The Brexit Party have proposed that the expansion of the academies and free schools programme 
should continue, as academies and free schools “have improved results”. However, as set out above, 
there is little evidence to suggest that this is the case, at a system level.104 
The Conservative Party has proposed a continuation of the academies programme though are some 
way off previous commitments of wanting to deliver a fully academised school system over the 
course of a parliament. They have also re-signalled their intention to open 200 new free schools in 
the coming years. They would also continue to intervene in schools where there is entrenched 
underperformance – suggesting that forced academisation for underperforming schools will remain 
(the Education and Adoption Act 2015 requires the Secretary of State to issue an academy order if a 
school is rated as inadequate by Ofsted).  
None of the party manifestos that have proposed reforms to school structures have at this stage set 
out how they would increase, or in some cases restore, capacity in local authorities in order to 
deliver the functions that they are proposing – beyond admissions which is largely managed by local 
authorities now anyway even if the academy trust is the ‘admissions authority’. In around one in five 
local authorities over 70 per cent of pupils are already educated in academies, meaning that the 
amount of funding that authorities have been able to ‘top-slice’ for central services has been 
reduced.  
Selective schools 
Despite featuring prominently in the 2017 General Election (following the government consultation 
‘Schools that work for everyone’ the previous year), selective or grammar schools are less of an issue 
in the 2019 election. They are not mentioned by the Labour Party, the Green Party, or the Brexit 
Party. The Liberal Democrats say that they would oppose any future expansion. 
The Conservative Party do not make any explicit commitment (either for or against academic 
selection), but appear to at least be leaving the door open to a future expansion by the inclusion of a 
broad statement to “ensure that parents can choose the schools that best suit their children and 
best prepare them for the future.” It may therefore be the case that in government they would seek 
expansion either by introducing legislation to allow new grammar schools, or through the current 
policy of allowing existing schools to grow and to set up ‘satellite’ schools. The evidence would 
strongly suggest that this would be detrimental to social mobility, particularly if expansion occurs 
where there is already a high density of grammar school places. These challenges are not unique to 
establishing new grammar schools, but also apply to the expansion of existing schools, and the use 
of quotas for admissions.105 
School places and class sizes 
The Liberal Democrats include a commitment to reduce class sizes, though they do not specify the 
age range that would be included or the scale of any reduction. The Labour Party have committed to 
reducing class sizes in primary schools to a maximum of 30 – though there is no commitment to any 
further legislation nor is it clear whether the existing exceptions would apply and if they did, 
whether they would be extended to all primary aged pupils. 
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In 2019, 10.9 per cent of primary school classes in England had more than 30 pupils – 2,378 classes 
at Key Stage 1 and 12,423 classes at Key Stage 2 exceeded this threshold. A very simplistic approach 
is to assume that the ambition of all classes being 30 pupils or fewer would be met if places were 
created for all those pupils in excess of this threshold – in total an additional 26,000 places. This 
would come at a cost of around £300m in capital expenditure for the creation of new school places, 
and ongoing teacher costs of around £40m per year.106 However, this is an incredibly conservative 
estimate as it assumes that all pupils in ‘oversized’ classes can be redistributed with perfect 
efficiency – i.e. to make classes with 30 pupils. In practice, it is far more likely that spare capacity 
would be created in the system, incurring significantly higher costs.  
The Green Party have the most ambitious target of reducing class sizes to under 20, though this is 
framed as a long-term ambition and therefore unlikely to be one that they would seek to deliver 
over the course of one parliament. 
Existing research also suggests that reducing class sizes has only weak impacts on attainment, and 
noticeable impacts only tend to be found for large reductions. Whilst the effects appear greater in 
the early years of school, they have been found to diminish over time, and are modest compared to 
the cost.107  
The number of secondary aged pupils is projected to increase by 11 per cent over the duration of the 
next parliament. The majority of new school places come from the expansion of existing schools, but 
new provision schools, which are currently largely free schools, will also provide new places. 
However, in recent years the free schools programme at secondary level has not necessarily been 
targeted at areas in need of new school places.108 
Private schools 
Both the Labour Party and the Green Party would charge VAT on private school fees. The Labour 
Party would also use their Social Justice Commission to consider how to integrate private schools 
into the state sector over the longer term. 
Increasing fees for private schools is likely to lead to an increase in the number of pupils in state-
funded schools. The Labour Party costings document estimates that around 5 per cent of privately 
educated pupils would join the state-funded system. This is based on IFS analysis of the elasticity of 
demand for private schooling, though we would advise caution about applying these estimates 
without testing for robustness against such a large increase in fees (of up to 20 per cent).109 
In January 2019 there were 570,000 pupils (FTE) being educated in independent schools in 
England.110 Therefore, the Labour Party are estimating that an additional 28,000 school places would 
be required. In 2019-20 average per pupil funding was £4,645 implying an additional cost of around 
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£130m. While such a volume of pupils is well within the normal fluctuations of pupil numbers at a 
national level, at a local level it might create additional pressure on school places – particularly if 
schools are forced to close. It is also possible that some private schools might cushion the impact of 
fees by reducing spending on bursaries and scholarships, reducing access for some middle and lower 
income groups. 
Specialist provision 
There are 1.3m pupils with an identified special educational need at state-funded schools in 
England.111 271,000 have an education, health and care plan (or statement of need) and 121,000 
attend state-funded special schools. 
Beyond commitments to additional funding by the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, the 
policy details about pupils with special educational needs and disabilities by the three main parties is 
limited. The Liberal Democrats discuss them within the context of the role of local authorities, and 
the Conservative Party say that they will create more places for those with complex needs. This is 
likely to be as part of the free schools programme. 
There are currently only 34 special free schools, fewer than half of which have been inspected by 
Ofsted, so it is difficult to judge whether this will result in high quality provision for these pupils. Of 
those that have been inspected, special free schools are less likely to be rated as outstanding, and 
more likely to be rated as inadequate, than other special schools.112 
The Green Party set out an objective for more pupils to be able to access local schools while 
retaining the option to attend a special school if that is what is wanted. The objective includes 
improving access to buildings, an ‘inclusive curriculum’, and more specially trained teachers. This 
would address the concern that pupils with complex special educational needs frequently do not 
have access to a local school that meets their needs, travelling on average three times as far as 
pupils who attend mainstream schools. However, the manifesto lacks any detail on how this would 
be achieved or how it would be funded. 
The Conservative Party also commit to the expansion of alternative provision for ‘pupils who have 
been excluded’. Such expansion should not override the default position that mainstream schooling 
is the expected setting unless the child’s best interests are met more effectively in specialist 
provision. The Labour Party aim to increase regulation of alternative provision. 
Overall assessment 
None of the parties have presented an evidence-based suite of policies that will improve access to 
good school places and address inequalities of access across the country. 
The research evidence suggests that large scale structural reform is unlikely to have a significant 
impact – positive or negative – on pupil outcomes. While the Conservative Party support the 
ongoing expansion of academies and free schools they are perhaps less vocal than they have been in 
the past, particularly on the former. The Labour Party and Liberal Democrats would reduce the 
powers of multi-academy trusts but appear to have stopped some way short of abandoning 
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academies altogether. It is the Green Party that are proposing the largest changes, calling for 
academies to return to local authority control.  
Such an approach represents a significant suite of reforms for unknown, and unproven gains. They 
would also attract significant cost and capacity demands in both central and local government. 
Grammar schools have not been the significant factor they were in manifestos in 2017, however 
there are indications that the Conservative Party would retain the option of expansion without 
saying so explicitly. The Liberal Democrats have ruled out any support for such an expansion. 
Commitments on providing places for pupils with special educational needs and disabilities are 
somewhat limited. While most parties have discussed additional funding for these pupils there is a 
paucity of other policy and the Conservative Party’s commitment to the expansion of alternative 
provision is framed as a mechanism for managing pupils who have been excluded rather than a 
setting that is necessarily in the child’s best interests. 
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Priority 6: Post-16 education, including technical and vocational 
After the age of 16, young people in England must select from a variety of routes intended to 
develop the right skills and knowledge to prepare them for the world of work or for higher 
education. The provision of a high-quality, well-funded, and accessible post-16 system is vital to 
support young people to make informed choices about their future. 
It is also increasingly important to ensure the right skills are being cultivated to meet productivity 
needs. In addition to current known challenges in the UK labour market, a new government may be 
preparing for the uncertain impact of leaving the European Union. Jobs requiring intermediate, 
technical skills appear the most vulnerable given the UK’s long-standing difficulty in generating these 
skills in its workforce.113  
The current landscape 
Post-16 routes 
While a pathway after secondary school involving A levels followed by study at university is often 
seen as typical, a growing proportion of young people go on to take vocational equivalents to A 
levels, continued GCSE study, GCSE level vocational qualifications, lower-level qualifications and 
apprenticeships. These less academic pathways can loosely be termed as further education (FE). The 
same level of esteem is typically not attached to FE as to more academic pathways. This is evidenced 
not only in the socio-economic segregation present in the system, but also by the disparities in 
resourcing and outcomes for those who pursue further education.  
The lack of parity is pressing because, as it stands, young people who follow further education 
pathways tend to have worse educational and employment outcomes, as well as poorer health 
outcomes on average than their peers following academic routes.  
There is also a longstanding issue with literacy and numeracy. A third of 16-year-olds in England do 
not achieve at least a grade 4 pass in GCSE English and maths each year. This is not adequately 
addressed by the post-16 system. Twenty to twenty-four year olds in England who have not entered 
higher education have lower levels of numeracy and literacy than peers educated to similar levels in 
other developed countries. England also has the third largest gap between the numeracy and 
literacy of those with the highest and lowest education levels. 
Social segregation in post-16 routes 
Our annual report on education in England assessed the attainment gap that exists between 
disadvantaged pupils and their peers at key stages of their education. It found that disadvantaged 
pupils are not equitably represented across all post-16 pathways. In 2017, 21.8 per cent of 
disadvantaged pupils would have needed to switch their post-16 destination to match the 
destinations of non-disadvantaged students in order for there to be parity in the system (Figure 6.1).  
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Figure 6.1: The post-16 destinations of young people in 2017 
 
Post-16 funding 
Between 2010-11 and 2018-19, real terms funding per student in school sixth forms, sixth form 
colleges, and further education (FE) colleges declined substantially, by 16 per cent, from £5,900 to 
£4,960. This is twice the rate that per pupil funding in schools fell by between 2009-10 and 2017-18 
(8 per cent).  
In fact, not only has 16-19 education been the biggest real terms loser of any phase of education 
since 2010-11, but it has also suffered from a long-run squeeze in funding: 30 years ago, 16-19 
funding was far higher (almost 1.5 times) than secondary school funding, but is now lower. 
The impact of these financial challenges appears to be making itself felt in the reduced number of 
learning hours received by students.114 
In the most recent spending round of September 2019, a one-year settlement was announced, 
committing an additional £400m of funding to 16-19 education for 2020-21. Much of this funding 
appears to be targeted towards further education, signalling a step towards addressing the current 
disparity between FE and academic pathways.  
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Progression from vocational and technical education 
There is a lack of clarity across the assorted array of vocational and technical further education 
options, without a transparent pathway for progression into higher qualifications.113 Young people 
who take these pathways are consequently less likely to continue education beyond the age of 19, 
and those that do are less well supported financially than those taking an academic route into higher 
education. This is in spite of potential for positive labour market returns from these additional 
qualifications. Improved careers guidance could potentially make a difference to this situation. As it 
stands, schools and colleges are not managing to meet the current standard set by the ‘Gatsby 
benchmarks’, and over a third of those in FE are not receiving information about the full range of 
apprenticeships available to them as further study. 
Reforms to post-16 settings and participation  
There have been significant changes in this area including making it mandatory for young people in 
16-19 education who have not already achieved a good pass in English and mathematics to continue 
to study those subjects;115 raising the participation age to 18 in 2015; the publication of a new 
Careers Strategy in 2017; and the introduction of the Apprenticeship Levy in 2017.  
Apprenticeships are an avenue by which recent governments have hoped to deliver high quality 
vocational and technical education and bolster the number of skilled workers, as well as raise the 
status of these types of qualifications. The government has recently acknowledged that the goal to 
achieve three million apprenticeship starts by 2020 would be missed.116 Key issues are around the 
quality of provision, lack of clear progression opportunities to more advanced qualifications and 
differential access, particularly at higher levels. A significant proportion of those starting 
apprenticeships are existing employees who are ‘converted’ to apprentices, whilst uptake is low 
among new starters and those younger than age 19 in comparison with successful apprenticeship 
schemes in other national settings. Equally, young people from disadvantaged backgrounds are 
disproportionately less likely to take up the apprenticeship route, particularly at higher and 
advanced levels.117  
T levels are new technical qualifications which are intended to be on par with A levels. These are 
currently being developed across 15 industries, with the first three due to be rolled out in 2020 and 
expected to be fully introduced by September 2023. However, senior officials in the Department for 
Education raised early concerns over the deliverability of the programme within this timetable.118 
Concerns are around whether they will receive support among young people and employers, as well 
as whether the skills exist in the workforce to deliver adequate teaching, and whether there is 
sufficient time to develop them to the quality required to make them a success. 
UTCs are a type of free school first introduced in 2010. They offer education to 14-19 year olds, with 
a strong focus on technical education. Many have struggled both to recruit and retain pupils. Ten out 
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of 58 of these schools have closed. The low numbers on roll are widely attributed to their starting 
age of 14, which does not fit well with the broader system which is essentially pre- and post-16.  
The requirement for young people to study towards GCSE English and maths up to the age of 19, 
including those aged 19 to 25 with an Education Health and Care Plan, has seen an early uplift in the 
number of people in this age range achieving the required level. However, despite these 
improvements, four-fifths of these young people still do not achieve the threshold by the age of 19. 
What should a new government do? 
▪ Provide the 16-19 phase with a more enduring financial settlement to sustain quality 
provision in the long term. In particular, the impetus behind the most recent financial 
commitment of £400m must be built upon into a new government, in order to ensure the 
imbalance between the 16-19 phase and other phases is addressed. 
▪ Carry over into a new government the focus on young people and technical pathways, 
including the development of new qualifications, and ensure that schools and colleges are 
sufficiently resourced to meet any new responsibilities.  
▪ Boost low literacy and numeracy skills among 16 to 19-year-olds and consider whether 
resits of GCSEs are necessarily the best way of delivering this. 
▪ Increase the number of 16-19 apprenticeship starts. A new government should consider the 
options to increase apprenticeship uptake among young people, including further 
redistribution of levy funding towards younger apprentices, or other incentives for 
employers to hire younger learners. 
Manifesto commitments 
All parties, except for the Brexit party, have pledged to increase funding for the 16-19 education 
phase, with much of this money being earmarked for the further education sector, as opposed to 
school sixth forms which mainly deliver A levels. Both the Liberal Democrats and Labour parties have 
made commitments which would see an increase in funding received directly by disadvantaged 
students aged 16-19, with a view to promoting equal access and retention at this phase of 
education. There are also commitments to capital funding to expand the further education and sixth 
form estate. 
Beyond funding, there are some less detailed proposals to improve vocational and technical 
education, and to improve careers guidance and advice. In terms of apprenticeships, all parties 
except for the Green Party have pledged to reform the Apprenticeship Levy, with the Brexit party 
pledging to abolish it. In each instance, apprenticeships appear to be framed in terms of education 
and training beyond the age of 18, with little focus on those aged 16-18. 
16-19 funding 
The Labour party pledged in their manifesto to “ensure fairness and sustainability in further 
education, aligning the base rate of per-pupil funding in post-16 education with Key Stage 4.” In 
correspondence with EPI, it was further clarified that the base rate would be raised to £4,921 in 
2023-24 cash terms.119 Adjusting to 2019-20 prices puts this proposed base rate at £4,558 by 2023-
24. 
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The Liberal Democrat policy in this area is to spend an additional £1bn in Further Education funding, 
including by refunding colleges for the VAT they pay. The party has also pledged to extend the Pupil 
Premium to young people aged 16-19, which is discussed below. The party has clarified that £820m 
of this funding will be applied to base funding per student in 2020-21, rising to around £900m by 
2024-25 in addition to the current £4,000 baseline.120  
Though not referenced in their manifesto document, the Conservative party is retaining the 
commitment of £400m one-year settlement for 16-19 education in 2020-21, announced in the 2019 
spending round. There is no funding commitment mentioned beyond this one-year settlement. 
Beyond £190m allocated to increase the current £4,000 basic funding rate for all students, £20m to 
support teacher recruitment and retention and £10m to fund the advanced maths premium, this 
spending is allocated largely towards further education, with £120m for courses with higher running 
costs; £25m for the delivery of T levels; £35m for targeted interventions to support students taking 
level 3 qualifications to re-sit GCSE English and mathematics. 
The Green Party has also pledged an uplift in spending in this phase of education. Specifically, the 
manifesto states that a Green government would “raise the funding rate for 16-17 year olds, 
followed by an annual rise in line with inflation…”. Without further clarification on the extent of the 
funding increase, it is difficult to compare this with pledges of other parties. 
Figure 6.2 compares party pledges to increase base funding per student. Where the Liberal 
Democrat and Conservative parties have specified overall totals pledged to uplift the per student 
base rate, these totals have been translated in to per student amounts. This calculation has taken 
account of projections of student numbers – which are expected to increase substantially over the 
next few years – and of the expected real terms fall in value of the current £4,000 base rate, which is 
not protected in cash terms under current government policy. Full details of the methodology are 
set out in Appendix 1.  
Figure 6.2 illustrates that the Conservative party pledge is lower and less sustained in comparison 
with the higher and longer term pledges detailed by the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. While 
the Liberal Democrat pledge would see a similar level of funding as Labour introduced much earlier, 
it appears that the pledged rise in funding thereafter (from £820m in 2020-21 to £900m by 2024-25), 
would not keep pace with the fall in the current base rate value or with the rise in student numbers. 
We also calculated an alternative scenario (not shown in the figure) which assumed a protected base 
rate. This alternative calculation found that the increase to £900m by 2024-25 as pledged by the 
Liberal Democrats would still result in a small decrease in per student funding due to the expected 
rise in student numbers. 
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Figure 6.2: Base funding per student 2019-20 to 2024-25 
  
Three parties have pledged capital funding for the post-16 sector, though the Conservative Party is 
the only one to provide figures. The Labour manifesto pledges “dedicated capital funding to expand 
[further education] provision” and the Green party has also pledged to provide a capital expansion 
fund for sixth form providers. The Conservative manifesto states they are “investing almost £2bn to 
upgrade the entire further education college estate.” This is a significant amount, going beyond the 
recommendation of £1bn made in the Augar review. 121 However, the Augar recommendation 
advocated “an additional £1bn capital investment over the coming spending review period”, as 
opposed to apportioned across a five-year period starting in 2021-22. 
Funding for disadvantaged students 
Both the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties have included pledges to reform the funding available 
to students aged 16-19 who are from less affluent backgrounds. In each of these policies, either all 
or a portion of the funding would be paid directly to the student. 
Labour proposes to reinstate the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA), with the stated intention 
of ensuring “fairness and sustainability in further education”. This was a scheme introduced in 2004 
and later abolished in 2011. The original programme consisted of cash transfers available to 16-19 
year olds of up to £30 a week, with the intention of tackling the attainment gap in that phase of 
education. Eligibility was based on low household income and conditional on education participation 
after the age of 16. Whilst evidence suggests that schemes in both England and Wales did have a 
positive impact on the participation and retention of those receiving the full £30 allowance in post-
16 education, the scheme was abolished in England in 2011 as it was considered that a large number 
of recipients would stay in education without the payments.122 The scheme continued in Wales. A 
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key difference to the post-16 landscape now is that since the abolition of EMA the compulsory 
participation age for education has been raised to 18.  
If reintroduced, the full payment available would be uprated to £35. This reflects inflation on £30 
since the abolition of the original scheme in 2011. However, it should be noted that this payment 
amount had not been protected in real terms since its pilot and introduction in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, meaning that by its abolition in 2011 the bursary payments were worth less than when 
the scheme was initially introduced. 
The Liberal Democrats have pledged to introduce a ‘young people’s premium’ which signifies the 
extension of the existing Pupil Premium to college students aged 16-19. The Pupil Premium is an 
initiative introduced by the Coalition government in 2011. The manifesto states that the young 
people’s premium would be based on the same eligibility criteria as the current Pupil Premium. A 
key difference however is that part of this fund would be paid directly to students, with the intention 
that this supports them with travel costs and other necessities, introducing some parallel with EMA 
payments. 
It would appear that the main intention behind each of these policies is to encourage more 
disadvantaged pupils to both enter and remain in education and training beyond the age of 16. 
Despite the raised participation age to 18, current data covering the destinations of pupils following 
the end of secondary education tell us that disadvantaged pupils are less likely than their more 
affluent peers to progress to education or training after GCSEs. Around 15 per cent of disadvantaged 
pupils are in employment rather than education or have not ‘sustained’ their destination in the year 
after finishing Key Stage 4, compared with around six per cent of their more affluent peers. 123, 124 
Those who do progress to education are then less likely to complete their course or qualification. 
Furthermore, the current evidence base tells us that disadvantaged young people enter the post-16 
system with lower attainment on average, as well as being more likely to enter institutions with 
lower progression to higher qualifications.125 Less is known precisely about what happens to the 
disadvantage gap after the age of 16. There is therefore some scope to encourage a greater 
proportion of disadvantaged students to participate in education beyond the age of 16, as well as to 
reduce social segregation across different post-16 institutions (see Figure 6.1). 
In the case of EMA, the raising of the compulsory participation age to 18 means it is difficult to 
estimate based on previous evidence how a reinstatement would impact on participation or 
retention up to 18. 
Mechanisms are already in place within the post-16 sector intended to address these inequalities. 
The disadvantage uplift is applied through the National Funding Formula and is intended to 
compensate for area-based deprivation and for student populations with lower prior English and 
maths attainment. It therefore works similarly to the proposed young people’s premium, in that 
allocations are based on the level of disadvantage of the student body (based on different eligibility 
criteria), with a key difference being that a portion would be paid directly to the student under the 
                                                          
123 Department for Education, ‘Destinations of Key Stage 4 and 16-18 Students, England, 2017/18’, (October 
2019)  
124 Not sustained includes students with participation which did not last two terms, or who had no 
participation and claimed out-of-work benefits. 
125 Jo Hutchinson et al., ‘Education in England: Annual Report 2019’, (July 2019)  
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young people’s premium. It is not clear whether YPP is instead of or in addition to existing 
disadvantage funding. 
Another system that is currently in place is the 16-19 bursary scheme which provides financial 
support paid directly to the student. Though introduced as a replacement to EMA, this system has a 
much smaller budget than the original EMA and is paid at the discretion of providers as opposed to 
being applied through common eligibility criteria. We assumed that EMA would replace this bursary 
scheme if introduced. 
Within this report it is not possible to compare the direct funding component of each proposed 
policy. This is because, on the one hand, we lack detail from the Liberal Democrats on what 
proportion of the fund would be paid directly to students. On the other, while the Labour Party 
estimate that nearly 600,000 young people would be eligible for the bursary with over 475,000 
receiving the highest rate, without access to data on parental income it is difficult to estimate which 
students would be entitled to receive EMA. 
Here we estimate how the phase as a whole would be affected by the extension of Pupil Premium, 
specifically which types of institution would be likely to receive the greatest amount of the grant. 
This exercise will tell us a number of things: firstly, how disadvantage is currently distributed in the 
post-16 system and which types of institutions will therefore attract the greatest grant in young 
people’s premium; secondly, we will see how the grant will impact on each institution type’s overall 
per-student funding, and therefore how significant the grant would be for each institution type’s 
funding within the context of recent cuts; thirdly, the exercise will indicate where institutions may 
be incentivised to attract more disadvantaged students and therefore discourage social segregation 
in the system. To do this we use Key Stage 4 destinations statistics, which provide national data on 
the pathways taken by young people following the end of secondary school. Full details of the 
method can be found in Appendix 1.  
We present results for state-funded institutions alongside historical per-student funding, adjusted to 
2019-20 prices, to provide a contextualised view of how the extension of the Pupil Premium to 
young people aged 16-19 would impact on per-student funding in different state-funded institutions, 
assuming all other funding is unchanged for this phase.  
We find that: 
▪ Providers in the further education sector would have the largest amount targeted towards 
their students. This is mainly targeted towards FE colleges, owing to them being attended by 
a larger proportion of disadvantaged pupils. 
▪ Taking into account trends in real terms funding cuts over the past decade, the uplift in 
funding per-student received through the young people’s grant, in combination with the 
pledged uplift of the base rate funding, would reverse much of the per-student funding cuts 
felt by further education colleges. Cuts would be reversed to a lesser extent in other parts of 
the sector, particularly school sixth forms. 
▪ Introducing a young people’s premium may create incentives for sixth form colleges and 
school sixth forms to recruit more disadvantaged pupils, given that their numbers are 
currently proportionately low. 
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▪ About 115,000 young people would be eligible for the young people’s premium, contrasting 
with the Labour party’s estimates that over 475,000 young people would be eligible to 
receive the full rate of £35 EMA. 
Figure 6.3: Funding per student in the first year of study following secondary school, by institution type 
 
 
As noted above, it is difficult to predict precisely whether and how the young people’s premium or 
EMA would impact on the sustained participation of disadvantaged students in the post-16 
education system, particularly following the introduction of the raised participation age. 
Each scheme may well encourage participation, as there is evidence from previous EMA schemes 
that direct payments to students can aid this. The young people’s premium may do more as a 
scheme to encourage providers with currently lower numbers of disadvantaged students to attract 
more of these learners, thus potentially helping to ease social segregation in the system. Again, 
without evidence demonstrating that the Pupil Premium impacted on segregation levels in primary 
or secondary schools, it is difficult to project whether this will have the intended effect in post-16 
education. 
Improving vocational and technical pathways 
Party manifestos give little attention to issues around vocational and technical pathways in post-16 
education. Where it is mentioned, there is little detail provided. The Liberal Democrat Party 
proposes to “improve the quality of vocational education, including skills for entrepreneurship and 
self-employment.” The document does not expand further.  
There are numerous proposals across all parties (except for the Greens) to reform the 
apprenticeship levy. In addition to this, the Conservative manifesto states that the pledged large-
scale infrastructure projects will “require significant numbers of new UK apprentices”. Overall, these 
reforms are consistently framed in terms of adult re-training or post-18 education. What is missing is 
attention to funding or reform in 16-18 apprenticeships. The key concern that a new government 
£5,990
£5,670 £5,582
£5,431
£6,180
£5,289
£4,924
£4,711
£4,520
£5,186
£5,701
£5,124
£4,827 £4,769
£5,393
£0.00
£1,000.00
£2,000.00
£3,000.00
£4,000.00
£5,000.00
£6,000.00
£7,000.00
2012/13 2014/15 2016/17 2018/19 2020/21 2012/13 2014/15 2016/17 2018/19 2020/21 2012/13 2014/15 2016/17 2018/19 2020/21
Further education colleges Sixth form colleges School sixth forms
Further education sector Sixth forms
Estimated young people's premium grant
Pledged base funding uplift
16-19 funding per full-time student, including disadvantage and high needs funding, excluding student support, adjusted to 2019-20 prices
70 
 
should have regarding apprenticeships is both ensuring quality and encouraging more young people 
to take up apprenticeships, as opposed to focusing on numbers per se. 
The 20 Institutes of Technology referenced in the Conservative manifesto represent an opportunity 
to provide better clarity for progression into higher qualifications for students following technical 
post-16 routes. Ultimately however, the key focus needs to be on the quality of the qualifications, 
rather than the institutions in which they are provided.  
Careers guidance 
The Labour and Liberal Democrat party manifestos both contained a pledge relating to careers 
advice and guidance, though were scant on detail. Labour takes a broad approach, proposing to 
“reform existing careers advice, working towards an integrated information, advice and guidance 
system that covers the entire National Education Service.” The Liberal Democrat manifesto states 
that under their government they would “improve careers advice and links with employers in 
schools and colleges.” 
The Conservative manifesto makes a brief reference to careers, stating an intention to ensure young 
people with special educational needs have access to careers advice. Beyond this, we assume that 
the Careers Strategy announced in 2017 would continue to be government policy. 
Any new government must ensure efforts to improve or reform careers guidance focus particularly 
on disadvantaged young people and on technical pathways. Early engagement with employers is 
also an important priority, which is reflected in the Liberal Democrat pledge. In communicating the 
possible returns of various pathways to young people, it is important to broaden the focus beyond 
financial returns, and for example ensure evidence on the health and wellbeing outcomes of 
different education pathways is made available to inform careers advice. Ultimately, any new 
responsibilities for colleges in this area must be funded. 
Overall assessment 
All parties except the Brexit party have pledged to increase funding for the 16-19 education phase. 
The Conservatives have pledged the least and have not committed to additional funding beyond 
their one-year settlement. Labour’s pledge is lower than that made by the Liberal Democrats, but is 
set to rise significantly beyond the first year. Combined with additional funding provided by the 
young people’s premium, this would reverse a significant proportion of cuts felt in the last decade. 
There is little detail across manifestos on how technical education will be addressed in a new 
government. Our assumption is that current government policy on reforming qualifications including 
T levels will continue, but there is no detail on what funding will be provided and how quality will be 
ensured. 
No parties make reference to numeracy, literacy or the “forgotten third” – save it being implied by 
some pledging significant funding uplift in further education. Again, we have to assume that current 
government policy will continue, for example the requirement for some to re-sit English and maths 
GCSEs to achieve a basic level of qualification. There needs to be more explicit commitment and 
closer consideration of how best to tackle these issues. 
On apprenticeships, there is no clear focus from any party on the potential benefits of recruiting 
younger apprentices, and no clear plan on improving their quality.  
71 
 
Priority 7: Post-18 education 
Poor outcomes for young people impose economic and social costs not just on students but wider 
society. Skills shortages hamper UK competitiveness, productivity and wage growth.126 There is a 
particular challenge with basic literacy and numeracy skills among young people, as well as 
shortages in digital skills, intermediate skills, and higher technical skills.113  
Together these point to an education system that is not necessarily equipping workers with the skills 
required by the labour market. Research consistently indicates several key challenges for post-18 
education: the balance of routes across further and higher education; funding; participation and 
access; quality and value for money. 
The current landscape 
Balance of routes  
In 2014/15, there were eighty times more undergraduate, first time degrees awarded than technical 
qualifications at higher levels, with technical education struggling with a steep decline in numbers.127 
Where these Level 4 and 5 qualifications are being delivered, they are not always in subjects that 
meet the needs of the UK economy. Only a small minority are in STEM, where skills gaps are most 
acute, reflected in high wage returns to these qualifications relative to many degree holders.128 
There has also been a sharp decline in the proportion of post-19 students at GCSE and lower levels 
over the last 15 years, as well as falls in apprenticeship numbers. These qualifications outside of the 
traditional GCSE-A-level-degree pathway lack a clear, transparent structure that is easy for students 
and employers to navigate. 
It is not obvious that the structure of the UK economy demands this focus on degrees over other 
provision, with the UK having a high level of mismatch between workers’ skills and those required by 
employers. The OECD finds around 40 per cent of all UK workers are over- or under-qualified for 
their job, among the highest mismatch of the countries analysed.129 There is also some evidence that 
skills mismatches will widen in future, linked to major labour market changes including greater 
automation and IT within jobs.126 
                                                          
126 Industrial Strategy Council, ‘UK Skills Mismatch 2030’, (October 2019)  
127 Alison Wolf, Gerard Dominguez-Reig, and Peter Sellen, ‘Remaking Tertiary Education: Can We Create a 
System That Is Fair and Fit for Purpose?’, (November 2016) 
128 Héctor Espinoza and Stefan Speckesser, ‘A comparison of earnings related to higher level 
vocational/technical and academic education’, (April 2019) 
129 OECD, ‘Getting Skills Right: United Kingdom’, (November 2017) 
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Funding 
The imbalance between academic and other provision directly reflects post-18 funding 
arrangements. In February 2018, the government announced the Independent Review of Post-18 
Education and Funding, led by Philip Augar. This highlighted the marked funding gap between Higher 
Education (HE) and Further Education (FE): HE is the highest funded phase in England, while FE has 
seen sustained funding reductions.130 This has been exacerbated by differential rates of funding for 
similar qualification types in FE and HE (Figure 7.1), and is likely to have had a disproportionate 
impact on disadvantaged learners, who are more likely to participate in FE. Total spending on adult 
education (excluding apprenticeships) has fallen by nearly two-thirds since 2003–04.  
Figure 7.1: Funding per student in higher education and further education by subject 2018/19131 
 
Rapidly changing employment patterns with shorter job cycles and longer working lives require 
many people to reskill and upskill. The Augar review notes that the post-18 funding system must 
respond to this need for flexibility, accommodating full and part-time students at different levels 
who may want to learn in a modular way across their lifetimes and across different institutions. 
Almost 40 per cent of 25-year-olds do not progress beyond GCSEs as their highest qualification, 
despite these higher skills being in demand by employers and providing wage gains to individuals. 
Living costs are often cited as a barrier to further learning. Unlike those in HE, those studying 
intermediate qualifications in FE are not eligible for full maintenance loans. 
The current post-18 funding system also creates perverse incentives within the HE sector towards 
providing particular courses. With nearly all universities charging the top level of fees for most or all 
of their subjects, the cheapest-to-teach subjects have expanded far more rapidly than the most 
expensive subjects.132  
                                                          
130 Department for Education, 'Independent Panel Report to the Review of Post-18 Education and Funding', 
(May 2019) 
131 ESFA, ‘Maximum loan amounts for advanced learner loans designated qualifications 2018 to 2019’ (March 
2018) and OfS, ‘Guide to funding 2018-19’, (May 2018) 
132 Dearden et al, ‘Higher Education Funding in England: Past, Present and Options for the Future’, (July 2017) 
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Participation and access 
The participation of young people in HE has increased rapidly; nearly 29 per cent of 18 year olds 
participate in higher education each year, up from 21 per cent a decade ago.133 However, there has 
been a marked decline among part-time students. This has occurred across all UK nations since at 
least 2010, with the largest drops seen in Wales (46 per cent fall) and England (63 per cent).134 The 
shared trend suggests the fall in English part-time numbers is not solely attributable to higher tuition 
fees introduced from 2012, though researchers from The Sutton Trust have estimated this may be 
responsible for 40 per cent of the overall fall in England.135 
There are also concerns about participation among mature students, some postgraduate students, 
overseas students from certain countries, and ethnic minority groups.136 This includes not only 
under-representation but mismatching between some students’ prior attainment and their 
university courses. New research shows that disadvantaged students and women attend courses 
that are below the level expected, given their prior attainment (‘undermatching’).137  
No progress has been made on narrowing the HE disadvantage gap, despite overall participation 
among disadvantaged groups hitting record levels and significant resources being spent by 
universities on widening participation activities.138 This is explained almost entirely by prior 
attainment in school, making investments in the school system to close this gap potentially a fruitful 
approach to improving access. Participation gaps raise several concerns around fairness, loss of 
human capital, risks to the financial sustainability of providers and the foregone economic and wider 
contribution that graduates make to the UK economy, culture and society.  
A related concern around fair HE access is the use of predicted grades and unconditional offers, 
particularly among disadvantaged students. For example, disadvantaged students with high prior 
attainment are predicted lower A level grades than their better off peers.139 This is important 
because under-predicted candidates are also more likely to apply to, and to be accepted on to, a 
university course for which they are overqualified. This could in turn affect their future labour 
market outcomes. The share of unconditional offers has also increased dramatically in recent years, 
attributed to greater competition for attracting students and rising tuition fees. Unconditional offers 
are more common at universities with lower entry requirements and among older students. The key 
concern is that they may be demotivating for students and lead to educational under-
achievement.140  
                                                          
133 Department for Education, ‘Participation Rates in Higher Education: Academic Years 2006/2007 – 
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Quality and value for money 
A key consequence of the imbalance in post-18 routes on offer – a long-term expansion of three-
year degrees alongside declines in other routes – is a relatively expensive post-18 system. HE 
funding was radically reformed in 2012, partly aimed at shifting the cost burden from the state to 
the student, as the primary beneficiary. The impact has been a marked increase in university funding 
alongside graduate debt, with graduates and taxpayers now roughly evenly sharing the costs of 
higher education.  
Whilst HE continues to provide a sizeable labour market return on average, this varies considerably 
by subject and institution attended, with similar variability within the returns to vocational 
qualifications.141, 142 It also means the biggest state subsidies go to the HE courses whose graduates 
earn the least, via unpaid student loans. These may nevertheless be socially valuable courses (such 
as nursing), though assessing the social value of different courses – as opposed to their narrower 
impact on students’ earnings – is challenging. 
What should a new government do? 
Education research suggests that policies should: 
▪ expand and improve the quality and accessibility of vocational and technical education to 
lessen skill gaps and improve learner outcomes;  
▪ offer clear, connected pathways with employer buy-in and better careers advice to make the 
value of vocational and technical education clearer and easier to navigate for students, their 
families and employers; and 
▪ carefully consider the implications of any reforms to university funding and admissions for 
creating a more equitable higher education system.  
Manifesto commitments 
There are contrasts in the parties’ approach to university tuition fees; Labour proposes their 
abolition while the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats appear more inclined towards the current 
system. Several parties also plan to restore maintenance grants to provide support towards 
students’ living costs. There are also proposals which are specifically focused on university 
admissions and fair access to address underrepresented groups. 
The need to reform and improve funding for further and adult education is another common 
manifesto thread. This is welcome in the context of addressing national skills shortages and the 
marked funding gap with higher education. The main parties have all pledged significant support for 
lifelong learning which should directly benefit older learners wanting to learn new skills or retrain. 
Given the evidence on previous adult education programmes, how these policies are actually 
designed, monitored and regulated will be key to their success and final cost. 
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Higher Education 
Labour and the Green Party plan to abolish tuition fees. The Liberal Democrats do not commit to any 
specific fee announcements, instead planning a further review of HE finance in the next Parliament. 
This would follow the recent, comprehensive Augar report which provided an independent and 
evidence-based assessment of post-18 education funding. Its focus would be on making the HE 
finance system more progressive and reviewing alternatives to a loans-based system such as a 
graduate tax.143 
Proposals to abolish fees are hugely costly and result in the burden being shifted from graduates 
towards taxpayers, making the system less progressive. The policy favours high-earning graduates by 
reducing their lifetime repayments substantially, whilst low and middle earners would see little 
benefit as most do not currently fully repay their student loans. There is also little evidence that 
abolishing fees would encourage more school leavers from disadvantaged backgrounds to access 
higher education, as the chief barrier they face is lower attainment in secondary school. There are, 
however, some sub-groups for whom the tripling of fees since 2012 has adversely affected 
participation – namely part-time and mature students.144 Lower, or zero, fees could be one way to 
counter the sharp fall in demand among these students, though if this is the policy goal, it could be 
better met by more targeted investments to boost part-time and mature student participation.  
Where a new government opts to offset lower, or zero, tuition fees through increasing teaching 
grants, this would have the benefit of providing more flexibility over how funds are targeted. By 
allocating teaching grants to better reflect course costs and their social and economic value, this 
would help remove the current perverse incentives for universities to recruit students on the basis of 
profit margins and cross-subsidise other courses. 
Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party all plan to restore maintenance grants for 
disadvantaged learners, which were abolished in 2016. The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) estimates 
that the Liberal Democrat policy would cost around £600m per year whilst Labour’s plans would be 
more costly still, as the grants would extend not only to full-time undergraduates but to part-time 
students, and HE students at below degree level too.145 The combined cost of abolishing fees, and 
restoring and extending grants, under Labour’s proposals is estimated to increase the total 
government subsidy to HE by around £7bn.  
The IFS cautions, however, that the true cost of the policy could turn out to be higher still, if more 
generous financial support for HE students boosts demand to study at university. The IFS costings 
assume constant student numbers, whereas Labour is projecting HE student numbers to rise which 
would presumably further increase the IFS’s estimated costs. None of the manifestos have suggested 
reintroducing student number controls in England and Labour has confirmed it will not be doing 
this.146 Student number controls could be one way to limit the financial exposure of taxpayers. It is 
also worth noting that recent ONS accounting changes mean around half of the outlay on student 
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loans counts as current public spending. This means zero-fee and grant-restoration policies appear 
to add less new public spending than at the 2017 election. 
Restoring maintenance grants – like abolishing fees – reduces students’ notional debt on graduation 
and students from disadvantaged backgrounds currently accumulate the largest debts. However, it 
makes no actual difference to the financial support that students receive during their study. And like 
abolishing fees, it benefits higher-earning graduates because the bottom 60 per cent of graduate 
earners do not pay off their student debt before it is written off. There is no clear evidence that 
replacing maintenance loans with grants would boost the participation of disadvantaged students. If 
this is the policy aim, there are better ways to provide support for disadvantaged students. This 
includes targeting support at earlier ages. 
The Conservatives pledge to ‘look at’ the interest rates on student loan repayments with a view to 
reducing student debt, whilst the Brexit party pledges to abolish interest altogether. Currently 
students incur an interest rate of 3 per cent plus the Retail Prices Index (RPI) while they are studying 
and a variable rate thereafter, depending on earnings. Abolishing interest on student loans would 
make little or no difference to the most disadvantaged and the most advantaged students. The 
lowest earning graduates do not currently earn enough to repay their loan with interest, whilst the 
wealthiest students who do not take-out loans pay no interest at all. The graduates who stand to 
benefit most are the higher earners who currently incur the largest interest charges, shifting the cost 
burden towards taxpayers and making the current system less progressive. The IFS estimates that 
fully abolishing interest on loans in-line with the Brexit Party proposal would cost about £3.5bn, 
increasing the government contribution to HE by more than 40 per cent.  
The Green Party has previously pledged to fully cancel outstanding student debt, though this is not 
mentioned in their manifesto. The IFS estimates that this would come at a one-time cost of £70bn. 
Addressing existing student debt is something that the Labour party has also previously indicated it 
would tackle but, again, this is not mentioned in its manifesto. Partially or fully cancelling student 
debt is again costly depending on exactly how it is done and, under the current income-contingent 
loans system, such a policy would benefit higher-earning graduates the most and be at the expense 
of taxpayers.  
The Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats aim to widen access to higher education 
among disadvantaged and underrepresented groups. The Conservatives will ‘improve the application 
and offer system’ and require the Office for Students to ‘look at’ universities’ success in increasing 
access, whilst the Liberal Democrats will require transparency about selection criteria. Labour 
reforms appear to go further and are more specific, proposing post-qualification admissions (PQA) 
and use of contextual admissions across the system.  
There is a case for PQA to support wider participation, as young people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds are more likely to have their actual grades underpredicted. Giving young people longer 
to consider their choices should help them make more informed choices and could reduce the HE 
drop-out rate. However, there may also be downsides for some students. The compression of key 
activity into the summer period may mean applicants are not supported by teachers and advisers at 
the point when most advice would be required. This would deepen the divide between those who 
are well supported and those who are not. It could also require significant shifts to school and 
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university timetabling, potentially either shortening either study for exams, or the first term at 
university.  
Whilst there may be a case for PQA, it comes with uncertainties about the overall impact on 
widening participation. Labour’s proposal to implement contextualised admissions could be a better 
way to account for under-prediction of disadvantaged young people’s grades without any other 
associated logistical difficulties. The most significant cause of the participation gap is due to the 
difference in prior attainment at GCSE and A level (or equivalent), rather than the HE admissions 
process itself. Whilst contextualising HE admissions could help mitigate this under-achievement 
among disadvantaged pupils, a greater focus should be given to narrowing those gaps before entry 
to HE to help address the underlying cause.  
On international students, the Conservatives state: ‘our student visa will help universities attract 
talented young people and allow those students to stay on to apply for work here after they 
graduate’. The Liberal Democrats also plan to support these students, through a two-year work visa 
after graduation. The Labour position is less clear and depends on the outcome of Brexit: ‘If we 
remain in the EU, freedom of movement would continue. If we leave, it will be subject to 
negotiations, but we recognise the social and economic benefits that free movement has brought 
both in terms of EU citizens here and UK citizens abroad – and we will seek to protect those rights’. 
The economic impact of international students will depend on wider decisions taken about HE 
funding – which are not yet clear under the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats – as well as 
migration policy. One recent estimate of the net positive benefit to the UK economy per cohort of 
international students puts this figure at over £20bn, 147 indicating any reductions to international 
student numbers could be economically costly.  
Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats aim for 3 per cent of GDP to be spent on research and 
development – the former by 2030 and the latter, stating an interim target of 2.4 per cent by 2027 
which is consistent with the 2019 Spending Round. The Conservatives also pledge 2.4 per cent of 
GDP but with no timescales, committing instead to ‘the fastest ever increase in domestic public R&D 
spending, including in basic science research’. It is worth noting that the outlook for international 
students directly affects the research potential of UK universities due to the substantial cross-
subsidy from international students’ fees to research.  
Lifelong learning 
The Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats have all pledged significant financial support 
for adult education. The Conservatives propose a right to retrain fund worth around £600m per year 
from 2021-22 (or £580m in 2019-20 prices). Details are lacking but it aims to provide ‘matching 
funding for individuals and SMEs for high-quality education and training’, with a proportion reserved 
for further strategic investment in skills. Labour’s plans involve a free lifelong entitlement to training 
up to level 3 and six years at levels 4-6, with maintenance grants for disadvantaged learners. Labour 
will also restore funding for learners with English as a second or other language and provide 
‘additional entitlements for workers in industries that are significantly affected by industrial 
transition’. Together, these are much more costly then the Conservative’s adult education plans, at 
£3.3bn in 2023-24 (or just over £3bn in 2019-20). The Liberal Democrats propose a lifetime grant 
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worth £10,000. This is not tied to learning at specific levels but has restrictions on the ages at which 
adults can access the funding: £4,000 at age 25, £3,000 at age 40 and £3,000 at age 55. The 
estimated cost of the Liberal Democrat’s ‘Skills Wallet’ is £1.6bn in 2024-25 (almost £1.5bn in 2019-
20) – much less costly than the Labour policy but considerably more so than the Conservatives.  
All proposals carry uncertainties which will ultimately affect their final cost, including how many 
learners actually take up the opportunities. With almost half of adults qualified only up to GCSE level 
reporting cost as a barrier to undertaking further learning, proposals should go some way to 
redressing the fall in take up of intermediate qualifications. However, it is unclear whether 
maintenance support is available under any party for adult learners accessing level 3 qualifications. 
Currently, these learners, unlike those in HE, are not entitled to maintenance support, despite level 3 
tuition itself being free of charge and generally conferring good wage returns.  
The value for money of all adult education schemes will also depend on exactly which qualifications 
are undertaken at various levels, their deadweight and the extent to which they genuinely improve 
learners’ long-term outcomes. 148 Where adults improve their basic literacy and numeracy skills, the 
returns are likely to be positive for both individuals and wider society. However, existing evidence 
shows there is marked variation in the returns to both HE and FE courses. There is also a risk that 
additional courses taken by adults meet personal, rather than labour market needs, and at a 
substantial cost to taxpayers. Any new government must carefully monitor the uptake of 
qualifications and consider whether subject restrictions would be beneficial, if the goal is to align 
adults’ skills development with labour market demands. It is feasible that uptake is strongest among 
those learners who are already the most qualified which could widen, rather than narrow, the skills 
gap.  
It will also be critical to have strong regulation of the eligible courses under any adult skills policy. 
The Liberal Democrats will place this responsibility with the Office for Students. This is less clear 
under Conservatives and Labour, though Labour is planning a single regulatory body across further 
and adult education. The risk of fraud is a serious consideration for adult education; a similar 
‘Individual Learning Accounts’ scheme had to be abandoned in 2001 for this reason, after just one 
year.  
To support lifelong learning, both Labour and the Liberal Democrats plan to reform careers advice. 
Details are light but Labour will work towards an integrated information, advice and guidance 
system covering all stages of education, whilst the Liberal Democrats will give individuals access to 
free careers guidance. Currently qualifications outside of the traditional GCSE-A-level-degree 
pathway lack a clear, transparent structure. To the extent that better careers advice makes the value 
of vocational and technical education clearer and easier to navigate for learners and employers, this 
is a welcome development.  
Overall assessment 
The Conservative party policy is notable for its lack of detail on any of the pressing priorities facing 
the Higher Education sector. Its focus instead is on improving adult skills, which is in any case a 
higher priority than reducing tuition fees if the objective is to improve education and skills. This is by 
                                                          
148 Deadweight refers to the extent to which learners would have paid for the courses themselves, in the 
absence of government funding. 
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far the single biggest resource cost in the Conservative manifesto after NHS commitments, yet 
remains a less generous lifelong learning policy than either that pledged by the Liberal Democrats 
and especially Labour. 
The Labour party’s single most costly education policy is to abolish tuition fees and restore 
maintenance grants. Given that higher-earning graduates would be the main beneficiaries and that 
HE participation has continued to rise despite the tripling of tuition fees in 2012, this appears to be a 
poorly targeted policy which would have no impact on education quality. It could, however, help 
address the steep decline in part-time student numbers. Labour’s plans to reform admissions could 
hold more promise in improving access, whilst acknowledging most of the HE participation gap is 
explained by prior attainment in school.  
Like the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats plans in relation to HE are scant on detail, with the 
exception of restoring maintenance grants. This suffers from the same issues as Labour. The 
proposal is less costly as it does not include part-time and below degree-level students, though these 
are groups whose numbers have sharply declined in recent years and for whom more targeted 
support could be beneficial. But along with the Green Party’s pledge to abolish fees and restore 
grants, all three parties’ HE plans could, in reality, turn out to be far more costly if they cause a spike 
in student numbers.  
The Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats all pledge more funding for further and adult 
education. This is welcome in the context of pressing skills shortages at intermediate and higher 
technical levels, and the marked funding gap with higher education. Given the evidence on previous 
adult education programmes, how these policies are actually designed, monitored and regulated will 
be critical in determining their success and final cost. The institutional capability must also be there: 
provision must be high quality, delivered by institutions which can respond effectively to changing 
labour markets, and serve a highly diverse population. The overall impact on the skills gap is hard to 
predict. If uptake is strongest among those adults who are already the most qualified, this risks 
widening, rather than narrowing, the skills gap.   
The Brexit party’s one post-18 commitment is to abolish interest on student loans. This would not 
support the lowest earning graduates who do not currently earn enough to repay their loans with 
interest, whilst shifting the cost burden towards taxpayers.   
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Priority 8: Children and young people’s mental health 
The number of referrals to specialist children’s mental health services has increased by 26 per cent 
over the last five years. But rejection rates remain high: as many as one in four children referred to 
specialist mental health services were rejected in 2017/18. Waiting times are far longer than the 
government’s ambition of 4 weeks. As well as the effect on individuals, failure to address these 
challenges will present significant long-term economic impacts. 
The current landscape 
Recent trends in mental health 
NHS research shows that mental illness rates among 5 to 16 year-olds have increased from 10.1 per 
cent in 2004 to 11.2 per cent in 2017.149 The increase has been led by emotional disorders, which 
increased by 1.9 percentage points to 5.8 per cent in this time period. Rates are higher among older 
children and young people (CYP), reaching 16.9 per cent among 17 to 19 year-olds.  
Figure 8.1: Prevalence of mental illness amongst 5 to 16 year-olds 
 
High and increasing rates of mental illnesses among CYP are concerning and may reflect a 
combination of factors. While increases in referral rates are affected by changing attitudes to mental 
health, the trends presented here reflect estimates of the underlying rates of prevalence.   
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Relationship with other characteristics 
Socioeconomic disadvantage is a significant factor in mental health, with disadvantaged young 
people being at between two and three times higher risk of developing an illness.150 Socioeconomic 
disadvantage can be a direct psychological stressor, through poor housing or unsafe 
neighbourhoods. Furthermore, gang violence151, inter-parental conflict,152 and not being in 
education, employment or training (NEET)153 were identified by a government green paper as linked 
to mental health problems and are all more common among disadvantaged young people. 
The link between disadvantage and mental illness indicates that the increasing rate of child poverty 
is concerning. Child poverty is expected to rise by over six percentage points between 2016-17 and 
2023-24, 37 per cent, representing an additional 1.1 million children living in poverty.154 The increase 
would be felt by children from specific backgrounds particularly strongly, with over half of children in 
single parent families or families where no-one is in work predicted to be in poverty by 2023-24. 
Beyond socioeconomic disadvantage, mental illness among CYP is concentrated within other 
structurally disadvantaged demographics. Rates are higher among girls and LGBT youths, and among 
people with learning difficulties.155 156 There are also higher rates among children with long term 
illnesses and with physical and developmental problems, and the comorbidity of different mental 
health conditions is higher among children from lower income households.149 
Student mental health 
Levels of reported mental health issues are increasing among the student population. Approximately 
two per cent of UK-domiciled first-year HE students disclosed a mental health condition in 2015/16, 
five times the proportion in 2006/07.157 A recent survey also indicated increased demand for 
counselling services.157  
Consequences of poor mental health include academic failure, worse career prospects and even 
suicide. Student suicide rates have increased by 52 per cent since 2000/01, reaching 4.7 per 100,000 
of the population in 2016/17 – indicating an increase in both disclosure and prevalence of mental 
health issues.158 Men are overrepresented among student suicides.159 
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Several factors have been suggested as contributing to the rise in mental ill health among students, 
such as academic stressors and rising participation among young people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds who are more at risk of mental health issues. Research suggests high financial concerns 
are also linked to poor student mental health.160,161  
Concerns have been expressed about the availability of support for students with mental health 
conditions and the response of HE institutions to the problem. There is also no standardised HE 
equivalent to education, health, and care plans, meaning the level of support varying significantly 
between providers. 
Likely consequences 
If the government continues failing to meet these challenges, there are likely to be significant 
negative consequences. For example, our research shows 27.0 per cent of pupils with the SEN type 
Social, emotional and mental health (SEMH) undergo an ‘unexplained exit’ during their time in 
school.162 Similarly, rates for exclusions for these students are 1.02 per cent for permanent 
exclusions and 46.26 per cent for fixed period exclusions, compared to national averages of 0.10 per 
cent and 5.08 per cent respectively.163 1.3 per cent of CYP with mental illnesses come into contact 
with youth justice services, compared to 0.03 per cent of those without.149  
DfE statistics confirm that students with SEMH needs perform worse in their GCSE qualifications, 
with only 25.7 per cent achieving a level 4 or above in English and mathematics at GCSE, compared 
with a national average of 64.2 per cent.164 Using Attainment 8 (a more rounded measure of GCSE 
performance), children with SEMH have an average score of 25.9, compared to 46.5 for the national 
average.  
Child mental ill health is a strong predictor for mental health problems in later life. Among adults 
with a diagnosable mental health conditions, 75 per cent will have first presented symptoms by age 
24 and 50 per cent by age 14.165  
In terms of the broader economic and social impacts, a 2018 OECD report calculates the cost to the 
UK of mental ill-health at £94bn.166 This represents four per cent of national GDP, including the 
impact of lowered employment and productivity, and costs of treatment and associated social care.  
Unmet need 
The consequences of rising rates of mental ill health illustrate the importance of a system which 
functions appropriately and effectively. Despite this, EPI’s most recent report found significant areas 
of unmet need within the current system, with almost one in four children referred to specialist 
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mental health services in the year 2017/2018 being rejected.167 Waiting times are similarly 
concerning, with a median wait of 34 days for an initial assessment and 60 days for treatment.  
Staffing within CAMHS is another area facing significant strain. There are concerns around failing to 
meet standards on reliance on permanent workforce staff and on minimum staff to patient ratios. 
Recruitment problems do not relate exclusively to finances - there is a vacancy rate of 12.14 per cent 
among child and adolescent roles within psychiatry in English NHS trusts, one of the highest among 
psychiatry specialisms. This is compounded by a comparatively high dependence on locum staff.168 
Children’s services are also under significant pressure. Since 2010-11, spending on children’s services 
has fallen by 10 per cent in real-terms.169 As local authorities are devolved, the levels of provision are 
not standardised.  
Recent policy focus 
The 2018 government green paper Children and Young People’s Mental Health Provision discussed 
the identification of a designated senior lead for mental health within schools, correctly recognising 
the role of schools within the young people’s mental health system. As the green paper suggests 
school be incentivised rather than required to do this, provision will vary by school. The green paper 
also aims to improve waiting times, with a target of halving average waiting times to four weeks.  
The proposals put forward in the green paper fail to address sufficiently the recruitment and funding 
barriers currently facing the sector. Staffing problems do not exclusively relate to funding concerns 
and the green paper fails to address these through a recruitment and retention strategy.  
Common to all these core proposals are under-ambitious timescales, with a target of between one 
fifth and one quarter of the country having these improvements by the end of 2022/23. As current 
levels of unmet need are high, these plans do not act quickly enough to support the many young 
people whose welfare and educational attainment are negatively impacted by poor mental health.  
Priorities for an incoming government 
Research suggests that polices should: 
▪ provide a robust funding model which matches current prevalence levels and changes in 
line with alterations to standards on treatment and waiting lists, and underlying risk factors; 
▪ reduce the time spent waiting for treatment, including the necessary changes to workforce 
policy to ensure this; and 
▪ establish a preventative and early intervention based approach to mental health care, 
involving schools, parents and local authorities  
Manifesto commitments 
Mental health is an increasingly high-profile issue, with multiple political parties discussing the 
importance of establishing a parity of esteem between mental and physical health conditions. 
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Despite its significance however, commitments made by political parties often tend to be vague or 
exhibit a piecemeal approach, a problem when many areas of the existing system exhibit significant 
levels of unmet need. Whilst a lot of political focus is on children and young people’s (CYP) mental 
health, most of the detailed policy changes present within the manifestos tend to focus on mental 
health or the NHS more broadly, not recognising the unique aspects of how the system works for 
children and young people.  
National targets 
The Conservative manifesto makes no reference to reducing waiting times or other national 
standards in CYP mental health, suggesting a commitment to current government policy. This 
includes a commitment that at least 345,000 additional children or young people will receive mental 
health support (including via school-based teams) by 2023-24. 
In terms of changes to national standards, Labour focuses on eating disorders, committing to 
meeting NICE guidelines for these conditions and providing sufficient funding to do so. The focus on 
eating disorders specifically is similar to the NHS Long Term Plan, and whilst improvements in any 
treatment area are positive, focusing on one group of conditions is not necessarily the best strategy. 
This is because there are many mental health problems which affect young people at high rates and 
with serious consequences, with illness types being linked to different areas of vulnerability or 
disadvantage. 
One of the most quantifiable pledges specific to CYP mental health made by any of the main parties 
is the Liberal Democrats’ pledge to ensure that NHS treatment is provided to all children and young 
people with a diagnosable mental health condition, a significant increase compared to current 
treatment rates. A less specific commitment to introduce further mental health waiting time 
standards is also made, with children’s services being one of the first areas to see these increased 
standards. They also suggest increasing access to a range of talking therapies, though little detail is 
given on the scale of this.  
The Green Party manifesto commits to ensuring that access to evidence-based mental health 
therapies has a maximum waiting time of 28 days, and mentions that provision should be tailored 
for, among other groups, children and adolescents. This is a positive move and for many children 
would represent a significant decrease from current waiting times.  
There are only a small number of targets for treatment and waiting lists for children and young 
people with mental illnesses present in the parties’ manifestos, many of which are insufficiently 
specific. This is concerning as a key tool in holding care providers to account is the extent to which 
they meet government guidelines. With our research consistently finding high levels of unmet need 
within CAMHS, it is notable that some manifestos do not quantify how they wish to improve 
services, with treatment rates, waiting lists, and care quality all being important areas to have 
standards on. It is also disappointing that none of the manifestos discuss how they would attempt to 
reduce the rates of children on adult mental health wards, a practice that we know is currently still 
used despite the adverse effect it has on children.  
Funding 
With the Conservative manifesto not making commitments around the funding of children and 
young people’s mental health, we assume they remain committed to the current NHS Long Term 
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plan, involving CYP mental health funding rising at a rate higher than total NHS or mental health 
spending. 
The Labour manifesto commits an additional £845m a year specifically for children and young 
people’s mental health, with an additional £2bn on modernising hospital facilities across the NHS. 
This is a significant increase and the most specific commitment relating to funding made in any of 
the party manifestos. Greater detail on the breakdown of this funding and whether it will be ring-
fenced is necessary.  
The Liberal Democrats have committed to an increase of one percentage point on the basic rate of 
income tax to raise £7bn which will pay for some of their increased spending on health and social 
care. The manifesto states that some of this will be ring-fenced for mental health, a positive move, 
although there is no detail on what proportion of this additional amount will be ring-fenced for 
children and young people.  
For the parties which have made commitments, it is unclear the extent to which the children and 
young people’s area of provision within their funding policies on mental health is ring-fenced. It is 
also disappointing that no parties have attempted to link funding to levels of prevalence or risk 
factors. This is problematic as increasing prevalence levels will require increased care levels, and any 
funding model needs to respond to this appropriately.  
If prevalence and referral rates continue to increase, it is likely there will be repeated funding 
pressures with service delivery problems due to staffing and training issues. Parties should aim to be 
more explicit about how much funding will be aimed at preventative measures and how this will be 
spent, as rising need may outstrip funding commitments and there are practical limits to spending 
on more psychiatrists in the near-term. 
Neither the Green Party nor the Brexit Party have made specific commitments in this area.  
Workforce 
For all parties considered, any discussion of workforce policies has focused on policies at an NHS 
level, with little focus on the specific concerns facing children and young people’s mental health. 
This is concerning as this area faces acute challenges within the NHS workforce, and sector-specific 
solutions alongside more large-scale policies are likely to be necessary. In particular, the lack of 
qualified psychiatrists working within CAMHS is a concern and one which requires urgent action in 
addition to a longer-term commitment to training larger numbers.  
School Policy 
Labour has stated it wishes to employ almost 3,500 counsellors to be based within schools, in an 
attempt to guarantee that children have access to counsellors. The manifesto is unclear on the cost 
of this policy and where this funding comes from, whether it reflects part of the increased spending 
on mental health or an increased financial burden on schools. This is in combination with 
establishing “open access mental health hubs”. Locating more mental health professionals within 
the education system could help to reduce reliance on acute care, which is likely to be positive.  
The Liberal Democrats aim to ensure all frontline public service professionals are better trained in 
mental health, alongside introducing a Student Mental Health Charter which focuses on ensuring 
that all universities and colleges provide appropriate mental health provisions. Whether either of 
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these policies are effective is likely to depend on the details of the charter and the staff training, and 
how they are enforced and funded. They also want to ensure that there is immediate access to 
student support and counselling, and suggest moving to a ‘whole-school’ approach to mental health. 
The Liberal Democrats and Labour both commit to removing some elements of the formal 
examination system, citing student and staff wellbeing among other issues. Proposed alternatives to 
these tests need to make sure they do not undermine school accountability which could see a drop 
in school standards disproportionately affecting pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds.  
Behaviour policy is an important area, as a punitive behaviour management system may be linked to 
increased risk of mental health problems.170 Furthermore, unmet SEND needs may manifest as poor 
behaviour.171 There are comorbidities between mental health problems and other areas of SEND, 
and a whole school approach would need to recognise these.  
Early intervention 
Labour has committed £1bn extra to public health, including employing 4,500 more health visitors 
and school nurses and adding mental health assessments to maternal health checks six weeks after 
birth. It is also seeking to expand provision for looked after children or those whose family 
circumstances put them at increased risk of entering care. The Liberal Democrats propose a new 
Minister for Wellbeing, whose remit will include work towards reducing rates of Adverse Childhood 
Experiences, a useful area in terms of reducing acute risk factors in the development of mental 
illnesses.  
The integration of mental health checks into the pre-existing health system is likely to be a positive 
move if it can be done successfully. It is also good to see specific policies to support vulnerable 
children and young people by targeting known risk factors in mental health problems, although the 
success of all these areas of intervention is likely to depend significantly on whether they can be 
implemented with an appropriate funding model and workforce.  
Analysis by the Resolution Foundation suggests that the main parties commitments to social security 
spending will not lead to a reduction in child poverty and may even result in significant increases.172 
This suggests that none of the parties are taking sufficiently strong steps in challenging the 
occurrence of a key risk factor in the development of mental illness within children and young 
people. 
Beyond specific health-based initiatives, any policy proposals which are likely to reduce child 
poverty, exposure of young children to crime, and other similar risk factors are likely to be a positive 
form of early intervention. Our analysis is, however, limited to early intervention and preventative 
measures which are based within the health or education system.  
Overall assessment 
Whilst any commitment to increased staffing, support or funding has the capacity to be positive, all 
parties have failed to sufficiently recognise the broader problems within children and young people’s 
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mental health. A piecemeal approach of targeting certain areas of the system is unlikely to be 
effective without an overarching strategy where every area of the sector, including areas outside the 
formal health and education system, such as LAs, is held accountable.  
The Conservative manifesto has mentioned little in terms of concrete policy changes linked 
specifically to children and young people’s mental health, particularly with regards to funding and 
national targets. A lack of changes to national targets is likely to continue to leave larger levels of 
unmet need. There is little discussion of early intervention, and the possibility that child poverty 
rates would increase is concerning due to its effect on prevalence.  
Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats are more explicit in their funding strategies and appear to 
pledge additional funding for mental health, although both are unclear on ring-fencing and how this 
will be shared within the system, meaning more detail is needed to assess the effect of this upon the 
system. In particular, it is important to know how this funding is split between acute care and early 
intervention or preventative measures and the targets and accountability for these measures. The 
lack of a specific workforce policy from any party is concerning. 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats both have specific policies for mental health within schools which 
is positive, and recognise the importance of both mental health professionals in these settings and 
wider workforce being skilled in mental health.  
The Green party’s commitment to a target of 28 days for access to evidence-based mental health 
therapies is positive, but without specific policies on funding or the workforce, this is likely to be 
challenging to achieve. A lack of focus on early intervention means the system would remain skewed 
towards responding to high prevalence rates of illness, as opposed to reducing these rates.  
The Brexit Party at no point discuss mental health in their election contract.  
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Appendix 1: New analysis in this report 
This report contains a number of new pieces of analysis that are designed to aid understanding of 
the manifesto commitments. In order to do so, we have used a range of published datasets and 
made a number of assumptions. This appendix sets out this analysis in more detail.  
A1.1 The early years 
Due to the nature of pledges made by parties, we consider annual expenditure in 2023-24, with all 
costs in 2019-20 prices. The analysis ignores the effect of the Early Years Pupil Premium and capital 
funding, looking only at the effect of changes to entitlements, funding rates and hours provided. 
Usage 
Current usage levels (reflecting both proportion of children using a service and the proportion of 
eligible hours that they use) comes from ‘DfE Education provision: children under 5 years of age, 
January 2019’. Estimates of mean hours used were made by averaging the banded number of hours 
used by the relevant children. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/education-provision-
children-under-5-years-of-age-january-2019 
Hourly Rates 
Nine-month-olds to 2-year olds 
No specific claims are made in the manifestos on to the hourly rates provided by the government, so 
the rate is assumed to be the same as the one committed by the parties for the two-year-old 
entitlement. This is likely to underestimate the actual cost of delivering services to children this age.  
Two-year-olds 
Current funding rates come from the to the IFS ‘Proposals for the early years in England’ briefing 
note, which give an average hourly rate of £5.44. We consider two cases, one where rates are flat in 
cash terms, and one where they rise in line inflation. According to the same briefing note, by 2023-
24 Labour are committing to an average funding rate of £9.00 an hour and the Liberal Democrats to 
£7.22 an hour, both in 2023-24 prices. https://www.ifs.org.uk/election/2019/article/proposals-for-
the-early-years-in-england 
Three and four-year-olds 
Current minimum hourly rates for each local authority come from ‘DfE Early years national funding 
formula: funding rates and guidance’ for 2019-20. Again, the cases of constant in cash terms or rising 
with inflation were considered. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/early-years-national-
funding-formula-allocations-and-guidance 
According to the IFS, by 2024 the minimum hourly rates would be £5.36 under the Liberal 
Democrats, and £5.60 an hour under Labour, again in 2023-24 prices.  
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Usage cases: nine-month-olds to 2-year olds 
There are three possible approximations of usages rates: 
▪ Case 1: assume usage is the same as for three and four-year olds (94 per cent using the 
service and an average of 86 per cent of available hours used). This is because proposals 
either focus on it being universal, or being only for children whose parents are in work, both 
of which are true for different entitlements for children aged three and four. 
▪ Case 2: assume usage rate is the same as current usage of the two-year-old entitlement (68 
per cent using the service and an average of 88 per cent of available hours used), as two-
year olds are the age bracket closest to this new age bracket. 
▪ Case 3: assume an intermediate case - 80 per cent take-up and 86 per cent of available 
hours used 
Figure A.1.1: Average annual expenditure per eligible child aged 9 months to 2 years, considering different 
usage levels 
Average annual expenditure 
per eligible child aged 9 
months to 2 years in 2023-24 
(2019-20 prices) 
Labour/ 
Conservative/ 
Current Policy 
Liberal Democrats Green 
Case 1  
High take-up rate 
NA Working: £9,025 
Non-working: £0 
Working: £5,383 - £5,811 
Non-working: £5,383 - £5,811 
Case 2 
Low take-up rate 
NA Working: £6,718 
Non-working: £0 
Working: £4,007 - £4,326 
Non-working: £4,007 - £4,326 
Case 3 
Intermediate take-up rate (as 
used in figure 1.3) 
NA Working: £7,730 
Non-working: £0 
Working: £4,611 - £4,978 
Non-working: £4,611 - £4,978 
Usage case: two-year-old entitlement 
We consider four cases: 
▪ Case 1: usage rates for disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged children are the same and at 
the level of disadvantaged children for the current two-year-old entitlement (68 per cent 
take-up use on of 88 per cent of available hours); this is based on the idea that we are 
comparing similar age groups. 
▪ Case 2: the usage rates for disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged children are the same and 
at the 3 and 4-year-old entitlement level (94 per cent take-up use on of 86 per cent of 
available hours) – this is based on the idea that we are comparing similarly universal services 
▪ Case 3: the usage rates for disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged two-year olds are 
different. The usage rate for disadvantaged two-year olds remains the same and the usage 
rate for non-disadvantaged two-year olds is at the level for three and four-year olds. 
▪ Case 4: the usage rates for disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged children are the same, 
and are at an intermediate level between case 1 and case 2. This uses 80 per cent take-up 
and assumes 86 per cent of available hours are used. 
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Figure A.1.2: Average annual expenditure per eligible 2-year-old, considering different usage levels 
Average annual 
expenditure per 
eligible child in 2023-
24 (2019-20 prices) 
Conservative / 
Current Policy 
 
Labour Liberal 
Democrats 
Greens 
Case 1  
Low take-up rates 
Disadvantaged: 
£1,717 - £1,854 
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£0 
Disadvantaged: 
£5,683 
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£5,683 
Disadvantaged: 
£6,718  
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£6,718  
Disadvantaged: 
£4,007 - £4,326 
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£4,007 - £4,326 
Case 2 
High take-up rates 
NA Disadvantaged: 
£7,634 
Non-
Disadvantaged: 
£7,634 
Disadvantaged: 
£9,025 
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£9,025 
Disadvantaged: 
£5,383 - £5,811 
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£5,383 - £5,811 
Case 3 
Differentiated take-up 
rates 
NA Disadvantaged: 
£5,683 
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£7,634 
Disadvantaged: 
£6,718 
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£9,025 
Disadvantaged: 
£4,007 - £4,326 
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£5,383- £5,811 
Case 4: 
Intermediate take-up 
rates  
(As used in figure 1.3) 
NA Disadvantaged: 
£6,539  
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£6,539 
Disadvantaged: 
£7,730 
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£7,730 
Disadvantaged: 
£4,611 - £4,978  
Non-
disadvantaged: 
£4,611 - £4,978 
 Three and four-year-old Entitlement 
Usage rates are assumed to remain the same as usage rates are very similar between the 30 hour 
and 15 hour entitlement, so increasing the total entitlement again is likely to have only a small 
effect. As IFS data gives minimum funding commitments made by parties, here consider the 
minimum amount of spending. 
Figure A.1.3: Minimum annual expenditure per eligible three and four-year-old, considering different usage 
levels 
Minimum annual 
expenditure per eligible 
child in 2023-24 (2019-20 
prices) 
Conservative / 
Current Policy 
 
Labour Liberal 
Democrats 
Greens 
 Working: £3,563 - 
£3,846 
Non-working: £1,781 
- £1,923 
Working: £4,640 
Non-working: 
£4640 
 
Working: 
£6,545 
Non-working: 
£6,545 
Working: £4,157 
- £4,487 
Non-working: 
£4,157 - £4,487 
 
To calculate the current ratio of minimum to average rates, an average was calculated using the 
hourly rates by local authority, weighted by number of three and four-year-olds accessing these 
services, according to ‘Education provision: children under 5 years of age, January 2019’. For 2019-
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20, this gave a minimum rate of £4.30 and an average rate of £4.67. If we assume this ratio is 
constant, an estimation of average expenditure per eligible child can be calculated. 
Figure A.1.4: Estimate of average annual expenditure per eligible three and four-year-old, considering 
different usage levels 
Estimate of average 
annual expenditure per 
eligible child 2023-24 
(2019-20 prices) 
Conservative / 
Current Policy 
 
Labour Liberal Democrats Greens 
 Working: £3,869 - 
£4,176  
Non-working: 
£1,934- £2,088 
Working: £5,038 
Non-working: 
£5,038 
 
Working: £7,107 
Non-working: 
£7,107 
Working: £4,513 - 
£4,873 
Non-working: 
£4,513 - £4,873 
A1.2 School accountability 
Inspections 
The total number of inspections calculated for the 2017/18 academic year based on Ofsted monthly 
management information. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/monthly-
management-information-ofsteds-school-inspections-outcomes 
▪ Full inspections - year to date published by 31 Aug 2018 
▪ Short inspections - year to date published by 31 Aug 2018 
Cost of increased number of inspections estimated by: 
▪ Total number of inspections per year if on a three year cycle = total number of schools / 3 
(total number of schools taken from ‘Ofsted annual report 2017/18’ 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ofsted-annual-report-201718-education-
childrens-services-and-skills; 
▪ Minus the total number of inspections Ofsted carried out in 2017/18; 
▪ Multiplied by the average cost of an inspection of £7,200 taken from ‘National Audit Office: 
Ofsted’s inspection of schools’, uprated for inflation. 
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/ofsteds-inspection-of-schools/ 
Note that this is likely to be an underestimate since the cost of inspection of £7,200 incorporates 
around 60 per cent of inspections being short, one day, inspections. 
A1.3 School funding 
Proportion of schools by size of increase 
Derived from ‘DfE National funding formula tables for schools and high needs: 2020 to 2021’; column 
(i) percentage change in pupil-led NFF funding. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-funding-formula-tables-for-schools-and-
high-needs-2020-to-2021 
Percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals linked to this dataset from ‘DfE Schools pupils and 
their characteristics: January 2019’  
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https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-characteristics-january-2019 
Universal free school meals 
Number of eligible pupils 
The baseline numbers of pupils eligible for (and claiming) free school meals under the current policy 
is from the January 2019 school census published in ‘DfE Schools pupils and their characteristics: 
January 2019’ (see above). 
The Liberal Democrat and Labour pledges are to extend free school meals to all primary pupils. This 
only affects pupils in aged 6 to 10 (as those in reception, year 1 and year 2 are already eligible under 
the current Universal Infant Free School Meals policy). The estimated increase in the number of 
eligible pupils aged 6 to 10 is based on an FSM eligibility rate of 100 per cent – in practice around 85 
per cent would be expected to claim based on current take-up rates. 
The Liberal Democrats also plan to extend free school meals to pupils whose families receive 
Universal Credit (UC). Currently only those on UC with an annual net income of up to £7,400 (before 
benefits) are eligible for FSM. To derive the additional number of secondary pupils who become 
eligible we assume an eligibility rate of 50 per cent for pupils aged 11 to 15, based on ‘DfE Eligibility 
for free school meals, the early years pupil premium and the free early education entitlement for 
two-year-olds under Universal Credit Government: consultation response’ 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/692644/Government_response_FSM_and_EY_entitlements_under_Universal_Credit.pdf 
This states that: “Many respondents called for free school meals to be extended to all families on 
Universal Credit. However, this would mean that around half of all pupils would become eligible for 
free school meals, compared to a current rate of around 14 per cent”. 
In 2018, the 14 per cent FSM eligibility rate was similar for pupils of all ages and for the sub-set of 
secondary pupils. In 2019, the FSM rates are also similar across these two groups at 16 per cent. 
Given the wider uncertainties in how rates of FSM eligibility will evolve over time and across age 
groups – as well as over the roll-out of UC to 2022 – we have not attempted to adjust for this. 
Unit cost of provision 
The unit cost of providing a free meal for each eligible pupil is assumed to be £2.30 based on current 
funding rates. The rate of £2.30 is based on a survey carried out in 2012 which estimated the cost of 
primary school meals consisting of £1.20 in labour, £0.67 on ingredients, and £0.43 in overheads.173 
Our illustrative cost pressure is based on increasing labour costs by 30 per cent (an additional 36p 
per meal) and then by 64 per cent (an additional 77p per meal) – in line with historic and proposed 
increases to the minimum and living wage since the £2.30 unit cost was introduced. 
Teacher pay 
We estimated an approximate 1 per cent pay pressure created by increasing minimum salaries to 
£30,000 based on number of teachers currently below that level and the average increase needed to 
reach the minimum threshold.  
                                                          
173 Michael Nelson et al, ‘Seventh annual survey of take up of school lunches in England: 2011/12’, (July 2012) 
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The number of teachers by pay range was taken from Tables 9a and 9b of ‘DfE School workforce in 
England: November 2018’ https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/school-workforce-in-england-
november-2018 
Salaries were uplifted by 2.75 per cent, in line with the average increase in 2019-20 to estimate the 
total number of teachers currently in each pay range, we assumed that teachers were evenly 
distributed within each pay range. We then applied an average uplift based on the middle point of 
the pay range.  
Class sizes 
Data on the number and percent of primary school classes in England with more than 30 pupils is 
based on the DfE statistical release ‘Schools, pupils and their characteristics: January 2019’: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-characteristics-january-2019 
This is used to estimate how many additional school places would be needed under the Labour 
pledge of reducing primary class sizes to under 30. This estimate is then multiplied by the unit cost 
of providing a new primary school place, based on ‘NAO – Capital funding for schools’ 
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Capital-funding-for-schools.pdf 
Similarly, the number of additional school places is multiplied by the average cost of employing a 
primary school teacher, to derive the ongoing costs of the Labour class size pledge. This unit cost of a 
primary teacher is based on their average salary, based on ‘DfE School workforce in England: 
November 2018’, uprated for on-costs of 26 per cent. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/school-workforce-in-england-november-2018 
Both the capital and on-going teacher costs are lower bounds as they assume that all pupils in 
‘oversized’ classes are redistributed with perfect efficiency. Given wider uncertainties, the analysis 
does not attempt to take into account any interactions with other pledges on teacher salaries.  
A1.4 Teachers 
Estimating the number of hours of continuous professional development (CPD) accessed by teachers 
in England 
To estimate the number of hours of CPD currently accessed by teachers in England, we used the 
latest data from the Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS 2018). This is an international 
survey of teachers and school leaders conducted by the OECD every five years, most recently in 
2018. In this year, 2,009 and 2,376 lower secondary teachers (teaching years 7 up to and including 
GCSE year) responded to the survey. Schools and teachers are randomly sampled to ensure TALIS 
data are representative.174 
TALIS 2018 asked teachers to report the average hours per week spent upon selected tasks, 
including professional development. Findings are reported for full-time and part-time teachers split 
by primary and lower-secondary phase. Given that it is not clear how the Liberal Democrat pledge to 
introduce formalised entitlement to CPD would apply to part-time teachers, in terms of whether 
these teachers would also be entitled to the full 50 hours offer, this analysis focused solely on full-
                                                          
174 John Jerrim and Sam Sims, ‘The Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) 2018: Research report’, 
(June 2019) 
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time teachers. To calculate how this average weekly estimate translates into an annual total of CPD 
hours accessed, we assume firstly that teachers only access CPD during school term-time, and 
secondly that there are 39 weeks in a school year. We calculate averages for primary and secondary 
teachers separately. 
As commented on in the report, it is difficult to obtain consistent and reliable estimates of how 
many hours teachers are currently spending on professional development each week. Even within 
the same survey, teachers can report different numbers of total working hours depending on how 
that information is derived.175 Therefore, estimates of average hours spent on development activity 
should be treated with caution.  
Estimating current school expenditure on staff development 
To estimate current school expenditure on staff development, we take data published from 
Department for Education on long-term school spending trends.176 
This is a time series of school spending data compiled through matching separate spending datasets 
for academies and local authority maintained schools over time. The data is provided in a number of 
breakdowns, including spend per pupil on staff development in a given year between 2002 and 
2016. Expenditure is not split by phase so spending for primary and secondary schools are combined 
in each year. We take a four-year average of the spend per pupil on staff development from 2013-14 
to 2016-17 and multiply it by the total of primary and secondary full time equivalent (FTE) pupils in 
state-funded schools in January 2019 to estimate total current annual school expenditure on CPD. 
Pupil numbers are taken from Department for Education data on school and pupils numbers.177  
Finally, we adjust for 2019-20 prices. 
A1.5 Access to good schools  
Proportion of local authorities with more than 70 per cent of pupils in academies 
Calculation based on extract from DfE’s ‘Get Information about Schools’, November 2019. It includes 
all state-funded schools listed as open or open but proposed to close. Academies includes 
mainstream, special, and alternative provision: converter academies, sponsored academies, free 
schools, studio schools, and UTCs.  
Class sizes 
See A1.3 Class sizes. 
A1.6 Post-16 education, including technical and vocational 
Assessing the impact of 16-19 funding pledges on per student funding 
The Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties all pledged various uplifts to base rate 
funding for post-16 education. Pledges were either made in terms of the total funding that would be 
available to boost the base rate or in terms of an existing level of funding per student to be matched 
                                                          
175 Rebecca Allen et al, ‘New evidence on teachers’ working hours in England. An empirical analysis of four 
datasets’, (2019)   
176 Department for Education, ‘Trends in school spending: 2002 to 2016’, (August 2018) 
177 Department for Education, ‘Schools pupils and their characteristics: January 2019’, (June 2019) 
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in the post-16 phase. Pledges were also given on different timescales, ranging from one-year 
settlements to per student funding level to be matched by 2023-24. This analysis attempted to 
reconcile all pledges into a comparable format. 
For all parties, the same starting base rate was assumed at £4,000 as at 2019-20 as per the National 
Funding Formula.178 Given that this base rate is not protected in cash terms under current 
government policy, we calculated the expected fall in base rate according to the GDP deflators 
published alongside the 2019 Spring Statement (see A1.9) as set out in figure A.6.1. 
Figure A.6.1: Change in post-16 funding rate due to inflation 
 Projected base 
national funding rate 
per student 
Deflator 
2019-20 £4,000.00 1.000000 
2020-21 £3,927.65 0.981912 
2021-22 £3,852.95 0.963239 
2022-23 £3,779.10 0.944776 
2023-24 £3,705.13 0.926281 
2024-25 £3,632.60 0.908149 
Deflators derived from GDP deflators at market prices, and money GDP: March 2019 
(Spring Statement), figures for year 2024-25 extrapolated based on three year 
trends. 
Student numbers are expected to increase substantially in the next few years. To estimate numbers 
in each year to 2024-25, we took as our starting point the total FTE students aged 16-18 in education 
or training at end of calendar year 2018, using data from the government statistical release on 
Participation in Education Training and Employment 2018.179 To find the total FTE student numbers 
in state-funded education 2018, we added full-time and part-time students (the latter number 
multiplied by 0.5 to account for being part-time) and subtracted those in education in independent 
institutions. Next, to factor for increases in the student population, we applied to this baseline the 
percentage changes derived from the projected figures given in response to parliamentary Written 
Question 266272.180 
Accordingly, our projected student numbers are set out in Figure A.6.2.  
                                                          
178 Department for Education, ‘16 to 19 funding: How it works’, (January 2019) 
179 Department for Education, ‘Participation in education, training and employment: 2018’, (June 2019) 
180 UK Parliament, ‘Education: Young People: Written question – 266272’, (June 2019) 
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Figure A.6.2: Projected student numbers (FTE) in 16-18 state-funded education  
Projected FTE student numbers 
in state-funded 16-18 
education 
2018/19   1,257,850 
2019/20   1,263,455 
2020/21   1,297,088 
2021/22   1,332,962 
2022/23   1,375,563  
2023/24   1,419,285 
2024/25   1,462,527 
Percentage increase between 2023/24 and 
2024/25 extrapolated based on three year 
trends 
Where parties had pledged a total amount of funding available to uplift the per student base rate (as 
with the Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties pledging £820m and £190m respectively), the 
resulting per student base was calculated by dividing that full sum by the number of students in the 
relevant year and then summing it with the base rate value after adjusting for inflation. 
The Conservative Party has not specified in their manifesto any funding commitments beyond the 
year 2020-21. We have assumed that the base rate established in this year would be unprotected in 
cash terms and have therefore applied deflators in succeeding years.  
We have assumed that the Liberal Democrat and Conservative pledges are in real terms. 
Correspondence with the Labour party indicated that their estimate of a base rate of £4,921 by 
2023-24 was in cash terms – we therefore adjusted this amount to reflect 2019-20 prices. 
Estimating the impact of the young people’s premium on per student funding in post-16 institutions 
Here we estimate how the phase as a whole would be affected by the extension of Pupil Premium, 
specifically which types of institution would likely receive the greatest amount of the grant. This 
exercise will tell us a number of things: firstly, how disadvantage is currently distributed in the post-
16 system and which types of institutions will therefore attract the greatest grant in young people’s 
premium; secondly, we will see how the grant will impact on each institution type’s overall per-
student funding, and therefore how significant the grant would be for each institution type’s funding 
within context of recent cuts; thirdly, the exercise will indicate where institutions may be 
incentivised to attract more disadvantaged students and therefore discourage social segregation in 
the system. 
To do this we use Key stage 4 destinations statistics, which provide national data on the pathways 
taken by young people following the end of secondary school. We take the latest revised version of 
this data (2016/17), based on the destinations of KS4 pupils attending state-funded mainstream and 
special schools in most recent destinations data published by Department for Education.181 
We estimate how disadvantaged young people will be distributed across post-16 education 
institutions in the first year the Pupil Premium would be extended to them. This enables us to 
                                                          
181 Department for Education, ‘Statistics: destinations of key stage 4 and 16 to 18 (KS5) students)’, (February 
2019) 
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estimate the total amount that would be targeted towards each institution through the young 
people’s premium grant. We assumed the amount received per student in a given year would be the 
same as allocated to secondary pupils recorded as disadvantaged (recorded as eligible for free 
school meals at any point in six years previously). This amount is £935 (as opposed to £1,320 applied 
to primary pupils meeting same criteria). 
We then divide this total amount by the number of young people who progress to each institution, 
according to the destinations data – to arrive at an indication of how much the grant represents in 
funding per student in each institution, regardless of disadvantage. We do this because, as in the 
primary and secondary phases, we assume that providers will be able to spend their young people’s 
premium allocations on interventions that can be accessed by all students. 
Following this step, we then add this funding to existing 16-19 funding per student for each 
institution as at 2018/19 (excluding other student support paid directly to the student, but including 
the disadvantaged uplift included in the national funding formula), as calculated in previous EPI 
research.182  
This is the latest year for which we have data for. We also add the pledged uplift in per student base 
funding. 
The young people’s premium analysis does not take into account those young people who may have 
become disadvantaged after finishing secondary school, or those who would no longer be classed as 
disadvantaged. Equally, we have not considered how eligibility for Pupil Premium may change on a 
larger scale due to the introduction Universal Credit. It should further be noted that, whilst we 
would reasonably assume that in practice the young people’s premium would be applied for pupils 
fulfilling current Pupil Premium criteria other than free school meal eligibility, i.e. the pupil has ever 
been looked after by a local authority in England or is a service child (a the child of a member of the 
regular armed forces). However due to data limitations we are only able to consider the 
disadvantage criteria. We limit our estimates to the grant received by institution types for pupils 
undertaking their first year in post-16 education. It does not account for the total number of pupils 
at each institution type as it does not include students in the second or third year of their 
qualifications. It is likely that the totals allocated to each institution for students in their second or 
third year of study would be different from those allocated for students in their first year. This is due 
to variation in duration of study, drop-out rates being higher in some institutions, and varying levels 
of part-time and full-time students. We do not report figures for young people with destinations in 
special schools or pupil referral units, as the way these providers are reported on in the data is 
combined with pupils who may not be eligible for Pupil Premium. 
A1.7 Post-18 education 
No new analysis 
A1.8 Children and young people’s mental health 
No new analysis 
                                                          
182 Gerard Dominguez-Reig and David Robinson, ’16-19 education funding: Trends and implications’, (May 
2019) 
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A1.9 GDP deflators 
To support comparability of estimates, in several places throughout the report we have used GDP 
deflators to convert prices into a consistent 2019-2020 basis. We do this using the HM Treasury’s 
GDP deflators used at the 2019 Spring Statement, which are a measure of general inflation in the 
domestic economy: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/gdp-deflators-at-market-prices-and-
money-gdp-march-2019-spring-statement 
 
 
 
 
